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About the project 
RESPOND: Multilevel Governance of Mass Migration in Europe and Beyond is a 
comprehensive study of responses to the 2015 Refugee Crisis. One of the most visible 
impacts of the refugee crisis is the polarization of politics in EU Member States and intra-
Member State policy incoherence in responding to the crisis. Incoherence stems from diverse 
constitutional structures, legal provisions, economic conditions, public policies and cultural 
norms, and more research is needed to determine how to mitigate conflicting needs and 
objectives. With the goal of enhancing the governance capacity and policy coherence of the 
European Union (EU), its Member States and neighbours, RESPOND brings together fourteen 
partners from eleven countries and several different disciplines. In particular, the project aims 
to:  
• provide an in-depth understanding of the governance of recent mass migration at 
macro, meso and micro levels through cross-country comparative research; 
• critically analyse governance practices with the aim of enhancing the migration 
governance capacity and policy coherence of the EU, its member states and third 
countries. 
The countries selected for the study are Austria, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, 
Lebanon, Poland, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. By focusing on these countries, 
RESPOND studies migration governance along five thematic fields: (1) Border management 
and migration control (2) Refugee protection regimes, (3) Reception policies, (4) Integration 
policies, and (5) Conflicting Europeanization. These fields literally represent refugees’ 
journeys across borders, from their confrontations with protection policies, to their travels 
through reception centres, and in some cases, ending with their integration into new societies.   
To explore all of these dimensions, RESPOND employs a truly interdisciplinary approach, 
using legal and political analysis, comparative historical analysis, political claims analysis, 
socio-economic and cultural analysis, longitudinal survey analysis, interview-based analysis, 
and photo voice techniques (some of these methods are implemented later in the project). 
The research is innovatively designed as multi-level research on migration governance now 
operates beyond macro level actors, such as states or the EU.  Migration management 
engages meso and micro level actors as well.  Local governments, NGOs, associations and 
refugees are not merely the passive recipients of policies but are shaping policies from the 
ground-up. 
The project also focuses on learning from refugees. RESPOND defines a new subject 
position for refugees, as people who have been forced to find creative solutions to life 
threatening situations and as people who can generate new forms of knowledge and 









The report examines the UK legal and policy frameworks on border management and 
migration control and key narratives on migration control.  It situates them in the specificities 
of the UK context, and outlines the key developments in policies and politics of migration since 
the 1990s. Further, it maps developments related to the implementation of border 
management and migration control policies in the UK since 2011, as well as the actors 
involved and relations among them.  
In terms of methodology, the report draws on legal and policy analysis, qualitative content 
analysis and qualitative research interviews. The analysis of legislation and policy utilises both 
primary and secondary sources such as academic literature, research reports, reports by 
government institutions and NGOs. Definitions and conceptualisations follow those developed 
in the WP2 report on EU border management and migration controls (Karamanidou and 
Kasparek 2018). The section on narratives on border and migration controls in the UK draws 
on the qualitative content analysis of speeches by British prime ministers and Home 
Secretaries, as well as press releases issued by the Home Office. The section on 
implementation draws on academic literature, reports by government and third sector 
organisations, as well as on 13 interviews conducted with stakeholders from public and local 
authorities and the third sector, recruited through direct contact via email and snowballing 
techniques. 
Key findings include:  
• British border management practices rely heavily on pre-entry measures such as API 
and PNR information, the visa and entry clearance regime and biometric data, which 
prevent access to UK territory and produce the information that enables the conduct 
of at-the-border checks as well as internal controls, detention and return. 
• The UK border management and migration control regime is characterised by a high 
level of complexity of law and policy. There are at least 15 statutes regulating 
migration, in addition to statutory instruments implementing legislation (both domestic 
and EU), other legislative acts pertaining to criminal law, and the Immigration and 
Detention rules.  
• There are significant implementation issues raised, concerning efficiency, co-operation 
and communication among both Home Office agencies and between the Home Office 
and other actors, and as well as lack of comprehensive and reliable data. Another 
significant issue is the non-adherence of Home Office actors, such as case workers 
and ICE personnel to the ministry’s own guidance – albeit often unclear – or its 
application in an inconsistent manner. 
• Hostile environment measures have had an adverse impact at all levels and actors. 
They have created tensions among actors operating at the local level, their relations 
with the Home Office and their professional practices and ethics.  
• There are considerable tensions between human rights and asylum obligations on the 
one hand, and the border management and migration control regime on the other, 
which result in human rights violations and inhibit access to protection. These are 
underpinned by an active hostility and opposition to human rights and asylum regimes, 


















The aim of Work Package 2 of the RESPOND project is to explore border management and 
migration control policies in the EU and the countries selected for analysis by the RESPOND 
consortium. The current report provides an overview of the UK legal and policy frameworks 
on border management and migration control and key narratives on migration control.  Further, 
it maps developments related to the implementation of border management and migration 
control policies in the UK, as well as the actors involved and relations among them.  
The United Kingdom has a particular position within the European Union context. First, it 
has not fully participated in the EU instruments outlined in the preceding report on EU Border 
Management and Migration control (Karamanidou and Kasparek 2018). The UK participated 
in the intergovernmental phase of policy development concerning border management and 
migration control and adopted legal instruments on carrier sanctions, ILOs and facilitation (Ette 
and Gerdes 2007; Geddes 2005). However, it did not accede to Title IV of the Amsterdam 
Treaty supranationalising asylum and migration policy, maintaining the right to opt in or out of 
legal proposals, and remained out of Schengen arrangements (Ette and Gerdes 2007; Geddes 
2005). In short, while UK policymaking does not necessarily oppose EU legislative 
developments that enhance control capacities, it privileges what is perceived as prioritising 
national sovereignty and interests over increasing Europeanisation. Although it has been 
largely independent from EU policy developments, the perception that membership to the EU 
undermines the ability of the UK to control migration underpinned support for the country’s exit 
from the EU during the 2016 referendum (Bennet 2018; Dennison and Geddes 2018). These 
perceptions have persisted through the process of ‘Brexit’, which is still ongoing at the time of 
writing.   
Secondly, while the UK is primarily a destination country in terms of contemporary 
migration movements, its policy responses to migration are shaped by the country’s imperial 
and colonial history, which has rendered race and ethnicity central to policy developments and 
debates on migration (Erel, Murji and Nahaboo 2016; Virdee and McGeever 2018). The 
dynamics of race and racism have changed to an extent following the terrorist attacks in New 
York in 2001 and the growing securitisation and scapegoating of Muslim citizens and migrants, 
as well as the increasing hostility towards EU migrants especially from eastern Europe since 
the 2000s (Yuval-Davis, Wemyss and Costello 2018). However, racialized policies and 
practices of border management and migration control, in particular under the Conservative 
government’s ‘hostile environment’ policy1, have had a continuous and significant impact not 
only on recent and settled migrants to the UK, but also on British citizens of ethnic minority 
backgrounds (Erel, Murji and Nahaboo 2016; Yuval-Davis, Wemyss and Costello 2018). The  
 
                                               1	The	term	‘hostile	environment’	refers	to	a	set	of	measures	that	were	introduced	since	2012	in	order	to	create,	in	the	words	of	the	then	Home	Secretary,	a	‘hostile	environment’	for	migrants	without	legal	status	which	would	facilitate	their	detention	and	removal.	It	has	entailed	measures	such	as	intensified	legal	status	checks,	employment	checks	and	raids,	curtailment	of	access	to	healthcare,	accommodation,	bank	accounts,	and	driving	 licenses,	and	 obligations	 of	employers,	 landlords	 and	public	 bodies	 to	 inform	 immigration	authorities	(House	of	Lords	2018a;	Jones	et	al	2017;	Yuval-Davis,	Wemyss	and	Costello	2018)	
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2018 Windrush scandal2 is an example of such dynamics (House of Lords 2018a; Erel, Murji 
and Nahaboo 2016).  
The drive towards expanding UK border and migration control, however, precedes the 
introduction of the ‘hostile environment’ policy but displays the same drive towards controlling 
unauthorised migration. Similar to other European contexts, asylum and unauthorised 
migration have been problematized since the late 1980s (Bosworth 2008; Geddes 2005). 
Adopting a ‘migration management’ approach, UK migration policy favoured a moderately 
open policy towards highly skilled migrants, while actively discouraging asylum seeking, 
unauthorised entry and undocumented stay (Bosworth 2008; Bloch, Neal and Solomos 2013; 
Yuval-Davis, Wemyss and Costello 2018). Since the 1990s, border management and 
migration control instruments, including detention and deportation, expanded considerably 
(Bloch, Neal and Solomos 2013; Vaughn-Williams 2010). The same period saw the 
externalisation of the UK border in both its physical and intangible forms through the 
introduction of externalised border controls in France and Belgium and the expansion of visa 
regimes, carrier sanctions and information systems allowing controls to be exercised before 
departure (Bosworth 2008; Geddes 2005; Vaughn-Williams 2010). After 9/11, the 
securitisation of UK migration policy intensified through the increasing interconnection 
between migration control and anti-terrorism legislation (Bosworth 2008; Vaughn-Williams 
2010).  
While the migratory movements of 2015 were a key event for other European states, they 
had a more significant impact on political responses rather than on border management and 
migration control policies. Because of the geographical position of the UK, arrivals did not 
increase significantly, while refugees accessed UK territory mainly through resettlement 
programs rather than spontaneous arrivals (Collyer and King 2016; Sirriyeh 2018). Yet small 
numbers of migrants attempting to cross into the UK from the makeshift camps in Calais were 
constructed by the government as a ‘crisis’ (Bennett 2018; House of Commons 2016a; 2016b). 
With the exception of reinforcing already existing border management and surveillance 
arrangements, however, there was no significant impact on policy. Rather, the perception of 
a European ‘migration crisis’ fed into existing narratives of ‘securing’ borders against migratory 
movements that were illegalised and securitised in political and media discourse (Anderson 
2017; Bennett 2018; Sirriyeh 2018). A further significant effect was the utilisation of narratives 
of ‘crisis’ and failure of EU border management and migration control policies in the run-up to 
the referendum on the country’s exit from the European Union (Anderson 2017; Bennett 2018). 
 
 
                                               2	The	Windrush	scandal	refers	to	the	targeting	of	predominantly	British	Caribbean	citizens	for	detention	and	removal.	Windrush	was	the	ship	in	which	Caribbean	subjects	of	the	then	British	Empire	arrived	in	the	UK	in	order	to	fill	in	labour	shortages	in	the	aftermath	of	the	World	War	II.	Although	subjects	of	the	Empire	were	originally	considered	UK	citizens,	changes	in	citizenship	law	since	the	1960s,	informed	by	racism	and	hostility	to	migration,	weakened	provisions	for	safeguarding	their	formal	status.	One	of	the	consequences	was	 that	 while	 being	 in	 essence	 citizens,	 the	 ‘Windrush	 generation’	 and	 their	 descendants	 could	 not	formally	prove	their	citizenship	status	through	documentation	-	for	example	possessing	a	British	passport.		This	 rendered	 them	 deportable	 under	 the	 ‘hostile	 environment’	 and	 led	 to	 their	 erosion	 of	 rights	 to	employment,	healthcare	and	social	welfare	(Bloom	2018;	Wright	and	Madziva	2018).	
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2. Developments since 2011 
Border management and migration control policy developments since 2011 are best 
understood in the context of the ‘hostile environment’, a term used to describe an array of 
often highly coercive measures targeting migrants with no legal status and the curtailment of 
their rights (House of Lords 2018a; Jones et al 2017; Yuval-Davis, Wemyss and Costello 
2018). While this is a now widely used term in media and public discourse, especially in the 
light of the Windrush scandal, it is in fact rooted in government policy and discourse. Theresa 
May, the current Prime Minister and then Home Secretary, stated in 2012 that ‘the aim is to 
create here in Britain a really hostile environment for illegal migration’ (Daily Telegraph 2012) 
and the term has been widely used in government policy documents (Independent Chief 
Inspector for Borders and Migration [ICIBI] 2016a). Although renamed ‘the compliant 
environment’ following the Windrush scandal (The Guardian 2018a; Wemyss 2018), policies 
and their implementation continued to display the same emphasis on border and migration 
controls.  
Border management and migration control policies since 2011 – coinciding with the 
election of the Conservative Party to the government the previous year – have been shaped 
by a predominantly and increasingly hostile approach to migration. Like the Labour 
government before them, the Conservative government continued to an extend the ‘migration 
management’ approach, ostensibly aimed at attracting ‘wanted’ skilled labour migrants while 
preventing the entry and stay of ‘unwanted’ asylum seekers and undocumented migrants 
(Bloch, Neal and Solomos 2013; Partos and Bale 2015). While being presented as guided by 
the aim of ‘modernising’ migration and asylum policy (Partos and Bale 2015), it however 
privileged control objectives aimed at realising the frequently stated aim of reducing net 
migration to the UK. The reform of the visa system since 2011 aimed to enhance and facilitate 
the recruitment of skilled labour migrants, but also intersected with the objective of reducing 
net migration and what was perceived as entry of false grounds (Partos and Bale 2015). 
However, the ‘hostile environment’ policy represents a shift towards targeting unauthorised 
stay rather than entry, as the former accounts for the majority of migrants with no legal status 
in the UK, in order to ‘inhibit their ability to work and live in the UK (Yuval-Davies, Wemyss 
and Costello 2018: 233). Ultimately ‘hostile environment’- measures introduced since 2012 
have aimed at the removal of unauthorised migrants, which constituted a stated aim of 
government policy and was accompanied by an expansion of detention and removal powers 
and practices (Amnesty International 2017; Ikegwuruka 2017). Interviewed stakeholders were 
highly critical of hostile environment policies, in particular detention:  
There is plenty of evidence against that and certainly indefinite detention is a 
breach of all sorts of human rights. (Interview, Councillor, Green Party) 
The awful thing about detention is that […] there are no real safeguards against 
arbitrary detention. You know, there are no judicial oversights, the decision to detain 
someone isn’t overseen or authorised by a court or any independent… Nobody, it’s 
just taken by a civil servant you know, an immigration officer. So the power to detain 
exists in law, its devolved from the secretary of state to the immigration officers, but 
there is no independent oversight of the decision to detain. (Interview, Voluntary Sector 
Organisation, London) 
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One early example of the ‘hostile environment’ measures was the deployment of the so-called 
‘go home’ vans – known as Operation Vaken - in 2013. Vans with signs asking migrants with 
no legal status ‘to go home or face arrest’ were deployed in areas of London with high migrant 
populations. While the measure resulted in only 11 voluntary returns, it exemplified the 
adoption of publicly visible measures against unauthorised migration (Jones et al 2017; The 
Guardian 2013; Yuval-Davies, Wemyss and Costello 2018). The key legislative measures 
associated with the ‘hostile environment’, however, were the two Immigration Acts introduced 
in 2014 and 2016. These two Acts continued previous trends of increasingly restrictive 
policies, strengthening enforcement powers to search properties and residencies and 
imposing greater migration control responsibilities on employers, landlords and public 
authorities (House of Lords 2018a; Aliverti 2015). The most notable new ‘hostile environment’ 
measures were the ban on driving licences and bank accounts for those without legal status, 
introduced by the 2014 Immigration Act, as well as the extensive curtailment of appeal grounds 
against detention and removal decisions (ILPA 2016; Home Office 2018a). These two Acts 
also expanded the obligations of public authorities, such as the Departments of Education and 
the National Health Service, to cooperate with the Home Office on migration control (House 
of Lords 2018a).  
Another key feature of the UK border management and migration control regime is the 
privatisation of controls. While this trend pre-existed the Immigration Acts of 2014 and 2016, 
it intensified under the ‘hostile environment’ (House of Lords 2018). On the one hand, control 
functions are outsourced to for-profit actors, who are responsible for a range of services such 
as receiving and processing visa applications, running detention facilities, and implementing 
removals (Kaneff 2012; Shaw 2016; Corporate Watch 2018). On the other, legal measures 
introduced by these two acts can be understood in terms of ‘everyday bordering’, whereby 
public service agencies, businesses, employers and ordinary citizens ‘are turned into border 
guards’ (Wemyss 2018; Yuval-Davies, Wemyss and Costello 2018).  
 
3. Methodology 
The legal and policy sections of this report draw on the analysis of legislation and utilises both 
primary (legal and statutory instruments provided in Appendix 1) and secondary sources such 
as academic literature, research reports, reports by government institutions and NGOs. 
Definitions and conceptualisations follow those developed in the WP2 report on EU border 
management and migration controls (Karamanidou and Kasparek 2018).   
The section on narratives on border and migration controls in the UK draws on the 
qualitative content analysis of speeches by British prime ministers and Home Secretaries, as 
well as press releases issued by the Home Office. These were sourced from the Home Office 
webpage (http://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/home-office), using ‘migration’ and 
‘borders’ as keywords. Due to logistical and time limitation, a sample of 35 documents 
(Appendix 2) was selected on the basis of relevance and spread across the 2011-2017 period. 
The documents were analysed using NVivo qualitative software. The coding frame used for 
this task (Appendix 3), was created based on the WP guidelines and existing literature on 
migration discourses in the UK and was revised while coding to reflect emerging themes and 




The section on implementation draws on academic literature, reports by government and 
third sector organisations, as well as on 13 Interviews conducted with stakeholders from public 
and local authorities and the third sector, recruited through direct contact via email and 
snowballing techniques. A full list of interviewees is provided in Appendix 4. Unfortunately, 
agencies of Home Office with responsibilities in border management and migration control did 
not respond to invitations to participate in this research. The interviews were qualitatively 
analysed so as to discern the main issues and concerns pertaining to the implementation of 
border management and migration controls.  
The review procedure for this report has followed the overall project review standards, 
which includes a review by Primary Investigator, 1-2 external reviewers, WP co-leaders, and 
project coordinators. 
 
4. Legal and Policy Framework 
4.1 Pre-entry measures 
With the exception of British and certain Commonwealth citizens who have right of abode in 
the UK, all other nationals are subject to immigration controls (Immigration Act 1971, s 3(1); 
Clayton and Firth 2018). Taken together, the different aspects linked to pre-entry measures 
examined in this section pertain to developments around the exported border, whereby border 
and immigration controls are enacted outside UK territory (Clayton and Firth 2018). 
4.1.1 Entry clearance  
The issuance of visas in order to enter the UK is part of the Entry Clearance arrangements as 
set in UK law. The Immigration Act 1971 sets out an obligation for third country nationals with 
no right of abode to have entry clearance3. Citizens of non-EEA countries and nationals of 
countries requiring a visa thus need entry clearance to enter the UK to stay for more than six 
months (Immigration Rules [IR] 2018, para 24; Clayton and Firth 2018). Recognised refugees 
must also obtain entry clearance as the UK does not participate in 1959 Council of Europe 
Agreement on the Abolition of Visas for Refugees (Clayton and Firth 2018).   
Entry clearance is issued by an Entry Clearance Officer (ECO) normally stationed in 
British embassies, consulates or similar authorities in third countries (IR 2018, par. 28). There 
is no provision for the role of Entry Clearance officers in Immigration Acts (Clayton and Firth 
2018) but the Immigration Rules (2018, par. 24-26) suggest the post is interchangeable with 
that of Immigration Officers.  Entry clearance can be refused if the applicant has not supplied 
the necessary documentation or information, has a criminal record, is considered a security 
risk, is subject to a deportation order, has been issued a travel ban, their previous immigration 
                                               
3 Defined as a visa, entry certificate or other document which, in accordance with the immigration 
rules, is to be taken as evidence or the requisite evidence of a person’s eligibility, though not a British 
citizen for entry into the United Kingdom (but does not include a work permit) (Immigration Act 1971, s 
33) 	
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record constitutes grounds for refusal, or they fail medical examinations and are thus 
considered a danger to public health (IR par. 320 (7A); Clayton and Firth 2018).  In 2012, Entry 
Clearance officers were given powers to refuse applications on the grounds of non-
genuineness (Home Office 2018a). Entry clearance operations are overseen by ICIBI (Clayton 
and Firth 2018). 
In addition, immigration controls are exempt from the provisions of section [hereafter ‘s’] 
29 of the Equality Act 2010, which prohibits public service employees from committing any 
action ‘that constitutes discrimination, harassment or victimisation’. In essence, this allows 
border control and immigration enforcement authorities to apply more strident immigration 
controls on certain nationalities – based on intelligence, without a corresponding duty to 
disclose which nationalities are being targeted (Clayton and Firth 2018).  
4.1.2 Visas 
The UK has not transposed Regulation 539/2001 (Recital 4), Regulation 810/2009 (Recital 
36) or Regulation 767/2008 which are part of the Schengen acquis. Thus, visa policy in the 
UK is determined at the national level. 
The list of nationals that require a Visa to enter the UK is determined by the Immigration 
Rules. At the time of writing, nationals of 111 countries required a Visa to enter the UK (IR 
2018, Appendix V). The UK authority for examining and issuing visa applications is UK Visas 
and Immigration, which is part of the Home Office (Home Office 2019a). Visa nationals wishing 
to enter the UK must apply to specific Visa Application Centres (VAC) at their country of origin 
(Clayton and Firth 2018). These are normally run by private companies, currently VFS Global 
(Kaneff 2013; VFS Global 2018). Entry Clearance Officers examine the applications and grant 
or refuse entry clearance. 
There are broadly four grounds to apply for visas: a) temporary visits (IR 2018 Appendix 
V) b) family reasons c) study and d) work.         
Visitor visas can be obtained by both non-visa and visa nationals who wish to enter for 
a range of reasons such as tourism, business, academic, creative or other events and short-
term activities, civil partnership or marriage, or transit (IR 2018, Appendix V). Non-Visa 
nationals are not required to apply for visitor visas unless they intend to marry or enter a civil 
partnership in the UK or their visit exceeds six months (IR Appendix V, para 1.2 & 1.3). Visa 
nationals applying for visitor visas are generally subject to a higher level of controls in order to 
deter overstaying, irregular employment and asylum seeking (Clayton and Firth 2018).  
Family members’ visas concern third country nationals who are ‘seeking to enter or 
remain in the UK on the basis of their family life with a person who is a British Citizen, is settled 
in the UK, or is in the UK with limited leave as a refugee or person granted humanitarian 
protection’ (IR 2018, Appendix FM; also IR 2018 part 8). This category is not governed by the 
1971 Immigration Act (s 1.4) but legislated under the IR (Clayton and Firth 2018). 
Study and Work visas are legislated under the Points Based System (PBS) (IR 2018, 
Part 6A).  They include five tiers for entry:  
Tier 1: Entrepreneurs, Investors, Exceptional Talent 
Tier 2: High skilled migrants 
Tier 3: Low skilled migrants 
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Tier 4: Students 
Tier 5 Temporary workers (IR 2018 part 4; Clayton and Firth 2018) 
For all visa routes, applicants must meet the specified criteria to be granted entry 
clearance. In the case of temporary visas, applicants must meet criteria related to a genuine 
intention to visit, duration of stay, maintenance and accommodation, intention to leave, 
credibility as well as special conditions attached to some sub-categories (Clayton and Firth 
2018a).  All types of visas entail the payment of fees, ranging from £93 for a sixth month visitor 
visa to £1623 for PBS tier one visas (Home Office 2018b). Additionally, a minimum income 
level of 18,600 was introduced for family visas in 2012 (Clayton and Firth 2018; House of 
Commons 2018a). There are limited rights for appeal or judicial review in all visa categories 
(Clayton and Firth 2018). In the case of visitor visas, the right of appeal stipulated by the 
Immigration Act 1999 (ss 59 & 60) was abolished in 2013. Since then only appeals on human 
rights grounds are allowed – mainly on grounds pertaining to the right to private and family life 
according to Art. 8 of ECHR (Clayton and Firth 2018). All visa applications require the provision 
of biometric data – fingerprints and photographs (Immigration (Provision of Physical Data) 
Regulations 2006, 2006/1743; Clayton and Firth 2018).  Fingerprints are checked against 
police and immigration databases – including Eurodac, as Regulation 603/2013/EU has been 
transposed to UK law – in order to decide on applications (Clayton and Firth 2018).  
4.1.3 Carrier Sanctions 
The United Kingdom has transposed Council Regulation 2001/51/EC on carrier sanctions. 
However, carriers’ liability in national law predated the transposition of the directive, therefore 
no changes to British legislation were made as a result (EMN 2012).  
The Immigration Act 1971 (Schedule 2 par. 26&27) stipulated that carriers had a 
responsibility to conform with immigration law although there was no statutory obligation for 
carriers to check identity documents or refuse embarkation (Clayton and Firth 2018). This was 
established by the Immigration (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1987, which rendered individuals and 
business entities responsible for checking passenger documentation. Liability extends to train 
and road carriers (Channel Tunnel (Channel Tunnel Carriers’ liability Order 1998, SI 
1998/1015; IAA 1999). The Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, repealing the 1987 Act, 
extended liability to all persons entering in a clandestine manner (IAA 1999 s. 32; Clayton and 
Firth 2018). A person is defined as a clandestine entrant if 
(a) he [sic]4 arrives in the United Kingdom concealed in a vehicle, ship or aircraft, 
(aa) he arrives in the United Kingdom concealed in a rail freight wagon, 
(b) he passes, or attempts to pass, through immigration control concealed in a 
vehicle, or 
(c) he arrives in the United Kingdom on a ship or aircraft, having embarked— 
(i) concealed in a vehicle; and 
                                               4	The	pronoun	‘he’	is	used	repeatedly	through	immigration	acts,	without	the	equivalent	use	of	the	female	pronoun.	Although	the	law	encompasses	both	sexes	in	terms	of	it	remit,	it	suggests	at	the	same	time,	a	heavily	gendered	understanding	of	migration.	
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(ii) at a time when the ship or aircraft was outside the United Kingdom, 
and claims, or indicates that he intends to seek, asylum in the United Kingdom or 
evades, or attempts to evade, immigration control. (IAA 1999, s 32 (1)) 
The scope of the definition includes a person who ‘indicates that he [sic] intends to seek 
asylum in the United Kingdom’ (Immigration Act 1999, S 32(1)), thus directly linking Carriers’ 
liability legislation with the prevention of asylum seeking (Clayton and Firth 2018). Although 
there is provision in guidelines for carriers that penalties can be refunded if an asylum 
application is successful, the legal provisions have a deterrent effect on carriers (Clayton and 
Firth 2018) and are at odds with the provisions of the Geneva Convention and EU law. 
The 1987 Immigration Act introduced fines of £1000 per passenger –increased to £2000 
by the Carriers Liability Regulation 2002– if carriers transported persons who sought entry to 
the UK without valid documentation (Bloom and Risse 2014; Clayton and Firth 2018). 
Penalties can be imposed on more than one person or carrier – for example the driver of a 
vehicle and their employer - in which case the maximum aggregate penalty is £4000. In case 
of more than one clandestine entrant, the maximum fine remains at £2000 (Clayton and Firth 
2018). The proscribed fines are at the lower level determined by Council Regulation 2001/51. 
The 2016 Immigration Act introduced a civil penalty scheme for air carriers that fail to ensure 
that passengers present themselves to immigration control, even because of errors (Home 
Office 2016a).  
4.1.4. API/PNR 
The UK has opted into Directives 2004/82/EC on the obligation of carriers to communicate 
passenger data and 2016/681/EU on the use of Passenger Name Record. As in the case of 
Carrier Liability legislation, UK law predated the introduction of relevant legislation. The 
Immigration and Asylum Act [IAA] 1999 amending the provisions of the Immigration Act 1971 
(Schedule 2, par 27 (2)) stipulated for the first time the obligation for carriers to provide 
information to immigration authorities on passengers ‘carried, or expected to be carried’ 
(Clayton and Firth 2018). The Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants Etc) Act 2004 
further stipulated that carriers must provide authorities with copies of documents of 
passengers. In addition to immigration authorities, the police can also require passenger 
information and, along with HMRC, they must share information with each other (IANA 2006, 
S 32&33; Clayton and Firth 2018). Details of the passenger-related information carriers must 
provide to authorities is specified in the Immigration and Police (Passenger, Crew and Service 
Information) Order 2008, SI 2008/5 and the Immigration Act 1971. The provision of this 
information has been obligatory since 2012 (Clayton and Firth 2018). As in the Directive, API 
Data is retained for 5 years with a possible extension of a further 5 on the grounds of law 
enforcement and migration control (European Commission 2012). However, the scope of 
British law extends beyond EU law, as it also covers data collected in relation to rail and sea 
travel (The Channel Tunnel (International Arrangements and Miscellaneous Provisions) 
(Amendment) Order 2007; Freitag 2018). At the domestic level, the Home Office Semaphore 
system is used to collect information on API (National Audit Office 2017). 
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4.1.5 Immigration Liaison Officers 
The UK has transposed Council Regulation (EC) 377/2004, although provisions relating to 
immigration liaison officers have not been affected Regulations 1168/2011/EU or 
2016/1624/EU, neither of which have been transposed by the UK. 
The role of Immigration Liaison Officer replaced the previous role of Airline Liaison Officer 
(ALOs) in 2008 (Clayton and Firth 2018; Home Office 2012a).  They are part of the Immigration 
Enforcement International division (formerly RALON) of the Home Office (Clayton and Firth 
2018), although they are posted under the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The key 
responsibilities of Immigration Liaison Managers (ILMs) are to liaise with airlines and advise 
on allowing embarkation on flights to the UK, for example based on the assessment of 
genuineness of identification and travel documents (Bloom and Rise 2014; Clayton and Firth 
2018; Scholten 2015). Similarly, ILMs provide training on forged documents to airline staff, 
advise on visa applications and risk assessment and intelligence gathering (Clayton and Firth 
2018; Home Office 2012a; Scholten 2015). ILMs are currently posted in 44 international 
immigration enforcement posts in both EU member states (for example Belgium and Greece) 
and third countries (Home Office 2018c).  
4.2 At-the-border controls  
As the UK is not part of the Schengen area, it has not transposed Regulations (EU) 2016//399 
(the Schengen Borders Code), its amendment 2017/458 on the reinforcement of checks 
against relevant databases, the Entry-Exit System (EU/2017/226) or the SIS II regulation 
((1987/2006/EC), although it participates in police and crime measures under it (Clayton and 
Firth 2018). It has, however, transposed Council Directive 2002/90/EC defining the facilitation 
of unauthorised entry, transit and residence and Council Framework Decision 2002/946/EC 
on strengthening the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit 
and residence. At the same time domestic developments around the externalised border mean 
that crossing the UK border, and thus border checks, can take place outside UK territory 
(Clayton and Firth 2018; National Audit Office 2017). 
4.2.1 Juxtaposed controls 
A particular feature of the UK border management architecture concerns juxtaposed controls5. 
Juxtaposed – from the French word juxtaposé – controls refer to reciprocal arrangements with 
France and Belgium established by the Sangatte Protocol to the Treaty of Canterbury (1991) 
and a further agreement between the United Kingdom, Belgium and France (1993) (Clayton 
2010; Ette and Gerdes 2007; Ryan 2004). Linked to the opening of the Channel Tunnel, these 
arrangements allowed for British immigration officers to conduct border controls in ports 
outside UK territory, and their French and Belgian counterparts to do likewise in UK ports 
(Clayton and Firth 2018; Ryan 2004). These arrangements allow the UK government to 
                                               5	While	they	are	in	a	sense	a	pre-entry	measure	reflecting	externalisation	processes,	they	are	discussed	in	this	section	because	of	their	pertinence	for	the	exercise	of	at-the-border	controls	(Clayton	2010;	Ryan	2004).	
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exercise ‘frontier controls’ in the designated control zone territories in France and Belgium 
(Clayton 2010). ‘Control zones’ are defined as 
the part of the territory of the host State determined by mutual agreement between the 
two Governments within which the officers of the adjoining State are empowered to 
effect controls (Sangatte Protocol, art 1 (g); Channel Tunnel Order 1993 Art 1 (g)). 
Following the operation of Eurostar, control zones were expanded to include railway 
stations in both France and Belgium and non-stopping trains among the three countries 
(Sangatte Protocol, art 7; Channel Tunnel order 1993 Art 7; Clayton 2010; Clayton and firth 
2018; Ryan 2004). In 2003, following the informal cooperation of British and French migration 
control authorities in Calais, juxtaposed migration controls were extended to sea ports in UK 
and France by the Treaty of Touquet (Clayton 2010; Clayton and Firth 2018). The Sangatte 
Protocol and ensuing legal arrangements designated France as responsible for receiving 
asylum applications submitted in control zones (Clayton and Firth 2018; Clayton 2010).  
4.2.2 Entry  
Arrival at a port of entry is distinct from leave to enter and actual entry into UK territory, which 
is not realised until a person is through the immigration control area of ports of entry such as 
airports, road or rail crossing points or ferry terminals (Immigration Act 1971; Clayton and Firth 
2018). Entry clearance is in essence leave to enter (Clayton and Firth 2018). However, 
immigration officers at the border can refuse entry or cancel an existing entry clearance on 
the grounds outlined in section 4.1.1, and in addition if the entry clearance was obtained 
through false representation, omitting material facts that could have affected the application, 
or if since the application there was a material change in the circumstances of the applicant 
(IR 2008 par. A320 to 324; Clayton and Firth 2018).  
Persons arriving at the UK border must provide appropriate identity documentation such 
as a passport ‘satisfactorily establishing his [sic] identity and nationality’ (Immigration Act 1971 
Schedule 2, par 2 (1) &4; IR 2018, part 1, par 11’). In addition, third country nationals must 
provide a visa if required (Immigration Act 1971 Schedule 2 par 4; IR 2018, part 1, par 11’). 
Any third country nationals arriving at the UK without the appropriate documents are in breach 
of legal provisions (Immigration Act 1971, s 3(1); Home Office 2017a). UK law, unlike EU 
legislation, explicitly criminalises ‘clandestine’ entry as defined in IAA 1999, s 32 (1) (see 
section 4.1.3 above) which is criminal offence punishable by a fine, imprisonment of up to 6 
months or both (immigration Act 1971, s 24 (1)). In addition to these provisions, a ‘clandestine’ 
migrant can be prosecuted for a range of other offences such as  
• Possession of false identity documents with improper intention (Immigration and 
Asylum Act 1999 s 31; Identity documents Act 2010) 
• Falsification of documents (Immigration Act 1971, s 26 (1)) 
• Entering the UK without a passport (AITCA 2004) 
• Forgery and connected offences (Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981) 
 
The law allows for certain grounds to be used as defence against prosecution for 
clandestine entry. Seeking international protection is one such defence but is permitted only 
when an applicant arrives ‘directly from a country where his [sic] life or freedom was 
threatened (IAA 1999). Other grounds include the applicant having: 
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(a) presented himself [sic] to the authorities in the United Kingdom without delay; 
(b) showed good cause for his illegal entry or presence; and 
(c) made a claim for asylum as soon as was reasonably practicable after his arrival in  
the United Kingdom. (Immigration Act 1999 s 31 (1); CPS 2018a) 
 
Arriving indirectly – via third countries - is a defence only insofar as a claimant ‘shows that 
he [sic] could not reasonably have expected to be given protection under the Refugee 
Convention in that other country’ (IAA 1999 s 31 (2)). These provisions were partially 
reinforced by a court decision, R v Naillie, which ruled that requesting asylum without the use 
of deception in the UK did not render an applicant a clandestine entrant (Clayton and Firth 
2018).  
Facilitating entry was a criminal offence in UK law before the transposition of Council 
Directives 2002/90/EC and 2002/946/EC. The Immigration Act 1971 (s 25 (2) (a)) included 
provisions on assisting illegal entry which was punishable with imprisonment of up to seven 
years (Clayton and Firth 2018). This was increased to a maximum penalty of 14 years, 
applicable outside the UK, in 2002 (NIA 2002, s 143). It also specifically penalises the 
facilitation of entry of asylum seekers ‘knowingly and for gain’, beyond the scope of Directive 
2002/90/EC (NIAA, s 143; Clayton and Firth 2018; Ette and Gerdes 2007).   
4.2.3 Border checks 
Immigration officers at border crossing points, currently operating under the UK Border Force 
(until 2012, the UK Border Agency) have powers to check that those entering have the 
appropriate documents, to search and detain documents and persons, to take fingerprints of 
persons who do not produce appropriate identity documents, do not have leave to enter, have 
made an application for asylum are subject to deportation orders (Immigration Act 1971 
Schedule 2; IAA 1999, s 141; Clayton and Firth 2018). The 2016 Immigration Act extended 
the powers of immigration officers to curtail leave to enter at the border if they suspect that a 
person might violate leave conditions (Immigration Act 1999, s 141; Immigration Act 2016). 
Not complying with the requests of immigration officers is a criminal offence (INA 2006, s 41; 
Clayton and Firth 2018).  
The powers of immigration officers under the 1999 and subsequent Acts applies to the 
control zones designated by the ‘juxtaposed controls regime’ (Clayton and Firth 2018; Clayton 
2010; Ryan 2004). One significant difference from at-the border checks in UK territory is that 
those refused entry in sea port control zones – although not rail control zones – do not have 
a right to appeal as accorded by the Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (Clayton 2010). Like 
other immigration control and enforcement personnel, immigration officers performing at-the-
border checks are exempt from the provisions of s 29 of the Equality Act 2010 (see also section 
4.1.1). As of 2015, the UK also conducts exit checks for all international travel (EMN 2016; 
ICIBI 2018a exit). Exit checks are not purely a border control measure but linked to measures 
under the 2015 Counter Terrorism and Security Act (EMN 2016).  
Immigration officers also have powers to stop, detain, search and interview both nationals 
and third country nationals at sea and air ports and sea port zones under anti-terrorism 
legislation (Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000, par 2; NIAA 2002 (Juxtaposed Controls) 
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Order 2003, SI 2003/2818; Clayton and Firth 2018). Although powers under the Terrorism Act 
are subject to the s 29 of the Equality Act, they ‘do not require a basis of reasonable suspicion’ 
and in case of complaints place the burden of proof to the complainant (Clayton and Firth 
2018: 217). These arrangements have been largely upheld by court decisions such as David 
Miranda v SSDH (2016) and Beghal v DDP (2015) (Clayton and Firth 2018). 
With regard to the use of EU databases, the UK did not transpose regulation 1987/2006 
(SIS II), although it participates in police and criminal aspects of Schengen, including access 
to the SIS II database since (Home Office 2016b; EMN 2016). The National Crime Agency is 
the designated SIRENE6 bureau (Home Office 2015a). API data as well as information from 
SIS II and domestic police and security databases is used to conduct entry and exit checks. 
For the purpose of the latter, the Home Office also developed the Initial Status Analysis (ISA) 
database (ICIBI 2018a).  
4.2.4 Border surveillance 
The UK is not part of the Schengen Area and has not transposed regulations 2016/399/EU 
(the Schengen Borders Code), 1052/2013/EU establishing the European Border Surveillance 
System, 1168/2011/EU establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union or 
2016/1624/EU establishing the European Border and coast Guard Agency. However, 
regulations 1168/2011/EU and 2016/1624/EU allow for the participation of the UK in 
‘operational actions’ (1168/2011/EU, recital 38) and ‘specific activities’ (2016/399/EU, Recital 
68) of Frontex on a case by case basis as decided by the Agency’s Management Board. It 
also has observer status in the Management board (Costello and Hancox 2014). The remit for 
this participation is weaker in the EBCGA regulation which states that the UK ‘may be invited 
to Management board meetings’ (rec 68), as opposed to ‘should be invited’ in Regulation 
1168/2011 (Rec 38). In practice, these arrangements allow the UK to participate in border 
surveillance operations by FRONTEX (Costello and Hancox 2014; House of Lords 2017).  
Similarly, the EUROSUR regulation allows for the participation of the UK and Ireland, on 
the basis of regional agreements, in information concerning the UK national situational picture, 
national situational pictures of member states and information collected by the UK that is 
relevant to the European situational picture or pre-border intelligence (Regulation 1053/2013, 
Art 19; House of Lords 2017a).  
Border surveillance is not explicitly defined in British law. Powers to conduct activities 
defined as border surveillance in Art 13 of the Schengen Borders code arise from the 
provisions of the Immigration Act 1971 which authorise immigration officers to ‘search any 
ship or aircraft and anything on board it, or any vehicle taken off a ship or aircraft on which it 
has been brought to the United Kingdom’ (Schedule 2, par 1, 5; Clayton 2010) in order to 
ascertain if persons meet the entry conditions. Domestic land border surveillance 
arrangements have little relevance within UK territory since the only land border is with another 
member state, Ireland, is a ‘frictionless’ border due to arrangements pertaining to the Common 
Travel Area and the Good Friday Agreement, therefore not the object of surveillance measures 
(National Audit Office 2017; Hayward and Phinnemore 2018).  However, border surveillance 
activities as described in the above paragraph take place in British ports, and under the 
                                               
6 National SIRENE (Supplementary Information Request at the National Entries) bureaus are 
responsible for information exchange and activities related to information alerts  
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juxtaposed controls regime in control zones in sea ports in France (NIAA (Juxtaposed 
Controls) Order 2003; The NIAA 2002 (Juxtaposed Controls) (Amendment) Order 2006; 
Clayton 2010). They are supported by a range of modalities and technological means of 
surveillance such as fencing, CCTV cameras, and motion and carbon monoxide detection 
(Home Office 2017b; House of Commons 2016a; Malcolm 2016; Migration Observatory 2014). 
4.2.5 Border surveillance at sea 
The UK has ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1997, the 
international convention for the Safety of life at Sea (SOLAS) in 1980 (UN 2018) and the 
International Convention on maritime Search and Rescue in 1985. Thus, border surveillance 
practices are bound by these treaties. Relevant EU legislation (Regulation 1168/2011/EU and 
Regulation 2016/1624/EU) has not been transposed.  
Sea border surveillance is legislated by the Immigration Act 1971. Immigration officers 
have powers to stop, board, divert and detain, and engage in hot pursuit of ships in UK 
territorial waters ‘for the purpose of preventing, detecting, investigating, or prosecuting an 
offence’ (Immigration Act 1971, Part 3A, s 28M) relating to ‘assisting unlawful immigration to 
member State’ (s 25); ‘Helping asylum-seeker to enter United Kingdom’ (s 25A) and ‘Assisting 
entry to United Kingdom in breach of deportation or exclusion order’ (s 25B). While the 
Immigration Act 1971 referred to a breach of these provisions in relation to the enforcement 
of maritime powers, the Immigration Act 2016 expanded their scope to include attempts 
against the above provisions (Schedule 14, s 2-4; Home Office 2016a). Equally the 
Immigration Act 1971 accords immigration officers the power to search and detain persons on 
ships and search for nationality documents (Harvey 2016).   
4.3 Internal controls 
The UK has transposed the first-generation asylum directives but has not recast second 
generation CEAS instruments or the Returns Directive. Therefore, the relevant EU legislation 
that has a bearing on the stay and residence of refugees, asylum seekers and undocumented 
and unauthorised migrants is: 
• Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on 
procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status 
• Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the 
qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or 
as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the 
protection granted 
• Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for 
the reception of asylum seekers 
• Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of 
unauthorised entry, transit and residence 
• Council framework Decision 2002/946/JHA of 28 November 2002 on the 
strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, 
transit and residence 
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4.3.1 Stay and Residence 
4.3.1.1 Recipients of international protection 
Recipients of international protection – in UK law refugee status – and their family members 
are entitled to a five-year residence permit (IR 2018, par 339Q). In line with EU legal 
arrangements, since 2005 refugee status is not permanent (ICAR 2010). Refugee status and 
the attached residence permit may also be revoked or not renewed (IR 339). Cessation 
grounds are identical to the Council Directive 2004/83/EC and include having re-availed of the 
protection of the country of nationality; re-acquisition of nationality if lost; acquisition of a new 
nationality; return and resettled to the country of origin voluntarily; the conditions in the country 
of nationality leading to refugee status have ceased to exist; is stateless, they can return to 
the country of habitual residence because of a change in circumstances there (IR p. 339A). A 
person can be excluded from refugee status on the basis of Articles 1 D, 1E or 1F of the 
Geneva Convention (The Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) 
Regulations 2006, s.7), with the stipulation that the Secretary of State ‘is satisfied that the 
person has instigated or otherwise participated in the crimes or acts mentioned therein’ (IR 
2018, par. 339A). Refugee status can be also revoked or not renewed if ‘misrepresentation or 
omission of facts, including the use of false documents’ led to the acquirement of refugee 
status (IR 339AA) and if a person to the security or the community of the UK (IR 339AC). The 
indefinite leave to remain attached to refugee status is similarly revoked or not renewed (IR 
2018 par 339BA). Humanitarian status – which is the equivalent of subsidiary protection in UK 
law – can be revoked or applicants excluded from it on the same grounds as with refugee 
status (IR par 339D, 339G, 339GB, 339GD). As with refugee status, recipients of humanitarian 
protection and their family members can be granted a five-year residence permit (IR 2018 
339Q). Recipients of international protection are issued with a Biometric Residence Permit (All 
Party Parliamentary Group on Refugees 2017). 
After the expiry of the initial five-year permit, refugees can be granted indefinite leave to 
remain and settle in the UK. In order for ILR to be granted recipients of refugee and 
humanitarian status and their dependants must have status that has not been revoked or not 
renewed, continuous residence of 5 years, and not to have committed offenses carrying 
imprisonment of at least four years or offenses carrying sentences of less than four years 
within specified time frames from the ILR grant (IR 2018 339R). In addition, ILR might not be 
granted if ‘in the view of the Secretary of State’ an applicant has ‘caused serious harm by their 
offending or persistently offended and shown a particular disregard for the law’ or 
‘demonstrated the undesirability of granting settlement in the United Kingdom in light of his or 
her conduct (including convictions which do not fall within paragraphs 339R(iii)(a-e)), 
character or associations or the fact that he or she represents a threat to national security’. 
Recipients of refugee and humanitarian protection status and their family members can 
obtain travel documents upon application, ‘unless compelling reasons of national security or 
public order otherwise require’ (IR 2018, par 344A). 
4.3.1.2 Asylum seekers 
Whether asylum seekers are given leave to remain in the UK depends on the outcome of the 
screening interview (Clayton and Firth 2018). Asylum applicants may receive the status of 
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‘temporary admission’ which is distinct from leave to enter7 and applies while an asylum claim 
is under examination (Right to Remain 2018; Clayton and Firth 2018). Home Office guidance 
explain this status as   
This does not mean that you have the right to remain in the UK or that you can stay 
permanently. However, it does allow you to stay in the UK whilst your asylum 
application is being considered (Home Office 2016c:11)  
Alternatively, asylum seekers may be detained following the screening interview. The UK 
has transposed Council Directives 2005/83/EC and 2003/9/EC which stipulate that migrants 
should not be detained solely for being asylum applicants. However, domestic law allows for 
the extensive detention of asylum seekers at different times of the asylum process (Clayton 
and Firth 2018; Right to Remain 2018). Detention of asylum applicants upon entry is possible 
under the provisions of the Immigration Act 1971 and its subsequent amendments8, which 
stipulates that a person can be detained in order for the authorities to examine their 
immigration status, their identity, and decide whether to grant or refuse leave to enter 
(Immigration Act 1971, Schedule 2, ss 2-3 & 16.1; Amnesty International 2017; Clayton and 
Firth 2018).  
Beyond these provisions, which apply to all migrants, there are no specific grounds in law 
concerning the detention of asylum seekers specifically (ECRE 2017, country report 2017). 
There is also no formal procedure for assessing whether detention is appropriate; it is decided 
on a case by case basis by Home Office caseworkers (Immigration Act 1971, Schedule 2, ss 
2-3 & 16.1; Home Office 2014a; Amnesty International 2017) and determined at policy level 
by Home Office guidance (AIDA 2017; Home Office 2018d).   
Asylum seekers can thus be detained on a number of grounds: 
• If they are likely to abscond, especially in relation to Dublin cases 
• If there is insufficient information to make a decision of granting temporary admission, 
or release a person who made an asylum application while in detention or whose 
identity cannot be confirmed 
• If an asylum application is examined under the accelerated procedure 
• If alternative arrangements need to be made for the care of a person  
• If a person has previously failed to comply with immigration bail, leave to enter or leave 
to remain conditions (Home Office 2018d; Home Office 2014a; House of Commons 
2018b) 
 
Applicants from safe third countries whose applications were considered unfounded were 
detained under the Detained Fast Track (DFT) scheme, in operation until 2015 (Amnesty 
2017; House of Commons 2016b; Liberty 2017a). This was replaced by the Detention Asylum   
Casework scheme in 2014, following the closure of DFT scheme after legal challenges 
(Amnesty 2017; Liberty 2018). There is also an additional list of 13 criteria, including ties to 
the community, previous failures to comply with immigration decisions, deception, and not 
providing ‘satisfactory or reliable’ answers to immigration officers (Home Office 2018d, par 
                                               
7 This was replaced by the status of ‘immigration bail’ in January 2018 (Right to Remain 2018).  
8 IAA 1999; NIAA 2002; UK Borders Act 2007; Immigration Act 2014; Immigration Act 2016 (Amnesty 
International 2017)		
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55.6.3; Home Office 2014a). Asylum detention in the UK is indefinite since there is no statutory 
limit (Amnesty international 2017; Clayton and Firth 2018). 
Home Office guidance advises against the detention of asylum seekers who are 
designated as ‘adults at risk’ and may be particularly vulnerable in detention. This applies to 
applicants who are 
• Pregnant 
• have been victims of torture 
• have a mental health condition or impairment, a serious physical disability 
• have been a victim of sexual or gender based violence, including female genital 
mutilation  
• have been a victim of human trafficking or modern slavery  
• have post-traumatic stress disorder  
• have serious physical health conditions or illnesses  
• are aged 70 or over  
• are a transsexual or intersex person (Home Office 2018e; Home Office 2014a; House 
of Commons 2018b) 
 
It should be noted that the above grounds are not prohibitive of detention but should be 
taken into account when decisions to detain asylum seekers are taken (Home Office 2018e; 
Home Office 2014a; Right to remain 2018). There is no formal vulnerability assessment 
procedure and decisions are taken on a case by case basis (Home Office 2014a). Rule 35 of 
the Detention Centre rules stipulates the review of the suitability for continued detention of 
vulnerable detainees by doctors in detention centres (Home Office 2014a; House of Commons 
2015a; Shaw 2016).  
There is no policy against the detention of women (Amnesty International 2017), unless 
one of the above conditions apply. Similarly, UK law and policy guidance allows the detention 
of children, including unaccompanied minors, although under the provisions of the Human 
Rights Act 1998, international human rights instruments and UK law, the interests of the child 
must be taken into account (Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, s 55 Immigration 
Act 2014, s.5; AIDA 2017; House of Commons 2018b). In a contradictory manner, the absence 
of care arrangements is one of the criteria that can justify detention, as is the existence of 
health conditions that give rise to concerns about a person’s wellbeing or public safety and 
health (Home Office 2018d, par 55.6.33). The detention of pregnant women (since 2016) and 
children, and families with children, is limited by law to 72 hours, or 7 days with approval by 
the Home Office (AIDA 2017; House of Commons 2018b, detention). According to Home 
Office documents, unaccompanied children are not generally detained, except in exceptional 
circumstances such as Dublin returns or if the Home Office believes they are adults (Home 
Office 2014a).  The detention time limit for unaccompanied minors is 24 hours (immigration 
Act 2014, s5). In general, policies of detention are circumscribed by case law. For example, 
court decisions have ruled detention of asylum seekers unlawful because no authorised 
reason was applied (AAM v SSHD [2012] EWHC2567). Domestic and European court 
decisions, however, has not necessarily challenged the legitimacy of detaining asylum 
seekers as in the case of Saadi v. UK (Clayton and Firth 2018). 
The residence of asylum seekers in the UK in terms of accommodation is subject to 
restrictions, broadly in accordance with the stipulations of the 2003 Reception Directive. 
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Asylum seekers have freedom of movement within the UK. However, if they are assessed as 
destitute, under policies of dispersal the Home Office designate their place of residence with 
no option to refuse the provided accommodation (IAA 1999, s 95; Asylum Support Regulations 
2000, regulation 13; AIDA 2017). In addition, UK law allows for reporting obligation to be 
imposed on asylum seekers as an alternative to detention, such as having to report to Home 
Office centres across the UK, or to designated police stations, surrendering travel documents 
and residence requirements (Immigration Act 1971, Schedule 2 par 21; NIAA 2002, s 71; 
Home Office 2016c).  
4.3.1.3 Irregular migrants 
Irregular migrants do not, by definition, have a right of residence in the UK.  Facilitation of stay 
is an offence – and has been criminalised long before the transposition of the Facilitation 
directive (Immigration Act 1971 s 25; FRA 2014). Furthermore, irregular stay is a criminal 
offence and is punishable by fine of £5000 and/or imprisonment of up to 14 years (Immigration 
Act 1971, s 24; s 25; Provera 2015).  Unlike the EU directive, UK law does not refer to financial 
profit and does not make space for humanitarian exceptions or the provision of essential 
services (Provera 2015). In a similar vein, UK law criminalises illegal working (Immigration Act 
1971, s 24B; immigration Act 2016, s 34)9 and bars persons without legal status from entering 
residential tenancy agreements (Immigration Act 2014 s 21; Aliverti 2016), while the 2016 
Immigration Act rendered the eviction of migrants who lose their legal status easier (Home 
Office 2016d). Since 2014, undocumented migrants are barred from opening bank accounts 
and obtaining driving licences (Immigration Act 2014, s 40, s 46). The Immigration Act 2016 
(s. 44) rendered driving in the UK while unlawfully resident a criminal offence, punishable with 
a custodial sentence and/or a fine (Harvey 2016).  Undocumented migrants are entitled to free 
emergency health care but are generally barred from accessing public services. Persons and 
institutions who facilitate irregular stay (through for example employing or renting to 
undocumented migrants) face both civil and criminal penalties (Aliverti 2016).  If not in 
detention, irregular migrants are subject to immigration bail conditions that may involve a 
number of reporting responsibilities and restrictions such as restrictions to residence, work, 
study, curfews and the use of electronic tags to those released from detention (Immigration 
Act 2016, Schedule 10; Home Office 2018f).  
4.3.2 Internal control and apprehension measures 
While the UK has not transposed EU legal instruments such as the Schengen Borders Code 
that provide a legal basis for internal control and apprehension measures, domestic legislation 
provides for an extensive regime of such policies.  
Immigration officers have wide ranging powers to search and arrest persons suspected 
for irregular stay, and to enter and search premises to this aim (Immigration Act 1971, s 28; 
Borders Act 2007, s 44-46;). Police officers in the UK also have powers to search an arrested 
person, or a person that has been released but is suspected of immigration offences, their 
property and since 2016 other premises for the purpose of establishing their identity and 
immigration status (Borders Act 2007, s 44-46; National Policing Improvement Agency 2011; 
                                               
9 Immigration Act 1971 criminalised irregular work in s 24, as failing to observe a condition of leave, 
while Immigration Act 2016 explicitly criminalised illegal working (Harvey 2016) 
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Immigration Act 2016). A number of police databases are used for establishing the identity 
and criminal records of third country nationals (ICIBI 2016b; 2014a). In addition, police officers 
can check a person against the Schengen Information System for the purpose of identification 
(National Policing Improvement Agency 2011). API and Exit check data in the Semaphore and 
ISA databases are used to identify migrants with no legal status or who are in breach of 
immigration conditions (ICIBI 2018a). 
The Employers Directive 2009 has not been transposed, yet in UK law the employment 
sector is a key area for internal control and apprehension measures. It is an offence to employ 
a person without legal status, punishable by a fine (IAA 1996, s. 8; IANA 2006, S 15, s 21). 
The maximum civil penalty in such case is 20,000 for each worker, while criminal penalties 
include fines and/or imprisonment of up to five years (Aliverti 2016). The Immigration Act 2016 
(s 35) extended the criminal liability of employers to ‘having reasonable cause to believe’ (s 
35) that the potential employee is an undocumented migrant. It also extended control powers 
to searching and arresting undocumented migrants for the offence of illegal working, and to 
enter and search business premises where illegal working is suspected to be taking place 
(Immigration Act 1971, s 28; Immigration Act 2016, Schedule 8). In particular, it gives 
authorities the power to search multiple premises with multiple entries (Schedule 8; 
immigration Act 1971 s 28D), although this power does not apply in Scotland (par (5); 
Immigration Act 1971, s 28D (2A)). The Immigration Act 2016 also granted immigration officers 
powers to enter and search premises for the purpose of checking driving licenses (Immigration 
Act 2016, s 43).   
In what concerns residential tenancies, since 2014 failing to check the status of potential 
tenants carries a civil penalty of up to 3,000 per lodger (Immigration Act 2014, s 23; Harvey 
2016; Home Office 2016d). The Immigration Act 2016 rendered renting accommodation to 
undocumented migrants, or those landlords who ‘have reasonable cause to believe’ are 
undocumented migrants, a criminal offence, punished by up to five-year imprisonment 
(Immigration Act 2016 s 39; Aliverti 2016). This provision, however, was not implemented at 
the time of writing in the devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland 
(Liberty 2018).  
Other public bodies, such as local authorities and the Inland Revenue, have had the power 
to provide information related to the status of third country nationals to the Home Office, if 
asked to do so (Immigration Act 1999; NIAA 2002, s. 129-130; Provera 2015). The Immigration 
Act 2016 established a duty for a wider range of public bodies, including the police, the NHS, 
schools, universities, marriage registrars and the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse authority 
to provide such information (Immigration Act 2016, s 55; Home Office 2016e; Harvey 2016; 
Wemyss 2018). Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and the national parliaments 
of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland as well as the House of Commons and House of 
Lords are excluded from these provisions (Immigration Act 2016, s 55; Home Office 2016e; 
Harvey 2016). Universities are expected to check the immigration status of students and face 
civil penalties, although with no criminal liability (Aliverti 2016).   
Banks are required to check the immigration status of persons opening a bank account 
(Immigration Act 2014, s 40). Since 2016 they must check the immigration status of third 
country nationals who already have bank accounts and notify the Home Office if they do not 
have legal status (Immigration Act 2016, s 45 and Schedule 7). The health surcharge 
introduced by Immigration act 2014 (s 38-39) has indirectly created responsibilities for the 
NHS to determine the immigration status of patients (Provera 2015).  
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4.4 Return and Readmission 
The UK has not transposed the Returns Directive, on the grounds that it would ‘pose a ‘risk to 
national control over how we remove people with no right to be here’ (Home Office 2017c 
letter). Return and detention for the purpose of return are regulated by domestic law and 
human rights instruments.  
4.4.1 Deportation and administrative removal 
While ‘return’ is a term employed in EU law, there are three relevant legal terms and 
procedures in UK law - deportation, administrative removal and voluntary return. However, as 
Clayton and Firth (2018) note, the terms ‘deportation’ and ‘removal’ are sometimes used 
interchangeably and can also refer to the act of carrying out a deportation.  
‘Deportation’ refers to the enforced removal of third country nationals from the UK when it 
is deemed ‘conducive to the public good’ by the Secretary of state or a Court, often after a 
prison sentence (Immigration Act 1971, s 5 and 6; Right to Remain 2018; Clayton and Firth 
2018). If someone has been sentenced to at least 12 months’ imprisonment or an offense 
prescribed by the 2002 Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act, s 72 (4), their deportation is 
automatically considered to be conducive to public good (Borders Act 2007, s 32; Clayton and 
Firth 2018). As the 1971 Immigration Act allows for further scope, Home Office guidance has 
interpreted these provisions to include sentences for gun and drug crimes of any length, 
consecutive sentences, persistent offending, offences committed outside the UK offences 
considered by the Secretary of State to have caused serious harm (Home Office 2015b). 
Further, the Home Office guidance stipulates that ‘deportation may be pursued in any case 
where the Secretary of State considers that the individual’s presence in the UK is not 
conducive to the public good’ (Home Office 2015b). Deportation orders issued by the 
Secretary of State, often following recommendations of courts upon sentencing, are not 
appealable but  can be not issued or revoked on specific grounds – the rights of the person 
under EU law, the ECHR, the Geneva Convention for Refugees, if the ‘foreign criminal’ is a 
minor, under extradition proceedings or cannot be deported on health grounds, or is a victim 
of trafficking the interests of the community, immigration enforcement or compassionate 
circumstances (IR 2018, par 390; UK Borders Act s 33; Immigration Act 1971, 3(6); UK 
Borders act, s 32; Clayton and Firth 2007).  
Administrative removal refers to the removal of persons who have entered in a clandestine 
manner or have no leave to remain in the UK, or their application for such leave has been 
removed. Grounds for administrative removals emanate from different legal acts. Immigration 
Act 1971 stipulated for the removal of third country nationals who are refused leave to enter 
or enter in a clandestine manner (Schedule 2, par, 8 and 9). Under the immigration Act 1999, 
grounds for removal included overstaying leave to enter or remain, breaking the conditions of 
leave to enter or remain, and obtaining leave to enter or remain by deception. The distinction 
between clandestine entrants and overstayers was abolished by the Immigration Act 2014, s 
1, which collapsed the grounds of the 1999 act into a single one of a person not having leave 
to enter or remain while legally obliged to do so (IAA 1999 s 10; Immigration Act 2014, s.1; 
Clayton and Firth 2018).  In the case of asylum seekers, while the law prohibits removal while 
a claim is being examined, it is only the actual removal that is precluded (NIAA 2002, s 77). 
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The authorities can still issue removal directions and make other preparatory steps (NIAA 
2002 s 77 (4)).  
‘Voluntary departure’ refers to the departure of migrants against whom enforced removal 
procedures have been issued (Blinder 2017). ‘Supervised departure’ refers to deportations 
under Immigration Act 1971 s 5(6) whereby the deportee waives appeal rights and their 
journey can be paid by the UK authorities (Immigration Act 1971 5(6); Clayton and Firth 2018). 
In technical terms voluntary departures include Notified (by the departing migrant) Voluntary 
Departures, Confirmed (by the Home Office) Voluntary Departures and Assisted Voluntary 
Returns (AVRs) (ICIBI 2015a; Blinder 2018). Assisted voluntary return programmes concern 
refused asylum seekers and migrants with no legal status, provide cash and or in-kind 
assistance, and have been implemented by IOM and the NGO Refugee Action between 2011 
and 2015 (McGhee and Bennette 2014). They do not apply to deportation cases (Clayton and 
Firth 2018).  
UK law does not prohibit the deportation or removal of either family members or minors. 
Family members – including civil partners – of persons under deportation procedures are also 
liable to be deported unless they have legal status of their own or have ceased to be members 
of the family of the person liable to deportation (Immigration Act 1971, s 5 (3); IR 2018 par 
365; Home Office 2015b; Right to Remain 2018). Deportation orders cannot be issued against 
family members after eight weeks of the deportation of the key family member (Immigration 
Act 1971, s 5(3)). Administrative removal provisions also allow the removal of families10 and 
children (IAA 1999; Immigration Act 2014). Asylum seekers who have arrived in the UK via an 
EU country are liable to be returned there under the Dublin Regulation, which the UK has 
transposed into domestic law (Home Office 2017d).   
There is no right of appeal against deportations and administrative removals (Clayton and 
Firth 2018; Right to Remain 2018; BID 2017; Home Office 2014b). They can be challenged in 
court only after human rights or asylum claims presented by the person to be removed or 
deported have been rejected by the secretary of state, or if there is an ongoing or new asylum 
claim or appeal (Right to Remain 2018).  In what concerns deportations, the Immigration Act 
of 2014 limited the human rights grounds that can be considered against the notion of public 
interest in cases where a ‘foreign criminal’ has been sentenced to four years or less. These 
include: 
• lawful residence in the UK for most of their life 
• social and cultural integration in the UK 
• there are significant impediments to integration in the country of origin after deportation 
• the person liable to deportation ‘has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a 
qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying 
child’, and the effects of the deportation would have a serious impact on them 
(Immigration Act 2014, s 19, (4) and (5)) 
The interpretation of key concepts such as ‘social integration’ and ‘unduly harsh’ are not 
defined in law but relies on court cases such as SSDH v Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813 and 
                                               
10 Family is defined rather differently in this case: it includes the partner, children, including under the 
care of the person to be deported, the parents of a person to be deported if they are a child and adult 
dependent relatives (IAA 1999). 	
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MAB USA [2015] UKUT (IAC). If the deportation concerns convictions of over four years, ‘very 
compelling circumstances’ (immigration Act 2014, s 19, (6); also IR 2018, par 391) must be 
present, in addition to the above grounds, for it to be challenged. Again, the interpretation of 
very compelling circumstances relies on Court decisions (Clayton and Firth 2018), while the 
IR designate deportation as ‘the proper course’ (IR 2018, par 391).  
However, a removal decision can be made while an appeal is pending (NIAA 2002, s 92; 
IANA 2006, s 47). In general, appeals against deportations or removals can be heard only 
from outside the UK, unless they involve asylum appeals or human rights grounds (NIAA 2002, 
s 92; Home Office 2018g). The Secretary of State has powers to certify appeals on human 
rights grounds unfounded (NIAA 2002 s 94). Immigration Act 2014 further strengthened these 
powers by stipulating that the Home Secretary could certify appeals on the grounds that the 
deported person would not face a risk of irreparable harm in the country of removal 
(Immigration Act 2014, s 117 (c); NIAA 2002 s 94B; Clayton and Firth 2018). The above 
grounds do not mean that deportation or removal won’t be affected, and in essence appeals 
are likely to be heard after deportation or removal (Home Office 2015b).  In the case of Dublin 
returns, while the Dublin Regulation allows for appeals, EU member states are designated as 
safe third countries for the purposes of return (AITCA 2004; Home Office 2017d). Therefore, 
the Home Secretary can certify the case as clearly unfounded, removing any in-country rights 
to appeal (AITCA 2004; Home Office 2017d). 
Judicial review is in most cases the main legal route to challenge both decisions to deport 
or remove as well as their implementation (Clayton and Firth 2018). Judicial reviews are 
normally heard in the Upper Tribunal or High Court and consider the lawfulness of Home Office 
decisions to deport or remove and if so request that the Home Office reviews their decision 
(Right to Remain 2018).  In Dublin cases, judicial review can be exercised against the 
certification as unfounded and the designation of a third country as safe (Home Office 2017d). 
Courts may issue injunctions to prevent a removal from being carried out (Home Office 2018h; 
Home Office 2018i). They are not however, a guarantee that a deportation or removal will not 
take place, as they do not have a blanket suspensive effect, or the outcome may uphold the 
original decision (Home Office 2018i; Right to Remain 2018). Another avenue for preventing 
removal is seeking an injunction under Rule 39 of the European Court of Human Rights (Home 
Office 2018h). 
The person liable to be deported must be issued with a notice (IR 2018, par 381; Home 
Office 2018h; NIAA 2002 s. 120). In the case of administrative removals, before 6 April 2015 
the Home Office notified a person that they are liable to be removed and the country to which 
they will be removed; after this date there is no a legal requirement to do so (Home Office 
2017e; ICIBI 2015a; Right to Remain 2018). Notifications include all information relevant to a 
case and inform the person liable to deportation or removal of deadlines to present their 
argument why they should not be deported (NIAA 2002 s 120; Home Office 2017e). Removal 
in the sense of the carrying out of the order can be effected to the country of nationality, ‘a 
country or territory to which there is reason to believe that he will be admitted’ which can be a 
country that has most recently provided the person under deportation order with travel 
documents (Immigration Act 1971, Schedule 3, par 1; IR, par 385).  While medical conditions 
and pregnancies must be taken into account, but they do not preclude removal (Home Office 
2018h).  In Dublin cases, the Home Office must request return to an EU state within two 
months from obtaining a Eurodac ‘hit’ or one month if the asylum seeker is in detention (Home 
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Office 2017d; Right to Remain 2018). If another country accepts responsibility, removal must 
take place within 6 months (Home Office 2017d; Right to Remain 2018). In the case of children 
and family members under administrative removal, the removal cannot be effected for 28 days 
until appeal rights have been exhausted and the removal of a parent/carer would mean that 
‘no relevant parent or carer would remain in the United Kingdom’ (NIAA 2002 78A; immigration 
Act 2014 s. 2; Home Office 2019b).  
Re-entry bans vary in length depending on the legal process followed and the immigration 
offences involved (Home Office 2017f).  Entry bans following administrative removals range 
between one and five years, depending on whether the person removed left voluntarily, how 
soon after the removal decision they left, whether they left on their own expense or not and 
the immigration offences involved (Home Office 2017f). Deportation orders carry a ten-year 
entry ban (IR 2018 par 362; Clayton and Firth 2018; Home Office 2017f). Children that have 
been deported as family members can be readmitted to the UK after they are 18 and spouses 
or civil partners after the end of a marriage or civil partnership (IR 2018, par 389). Revocation 
of a deportation order does not automatically allow for the right to re-enter the UK (IR 2018, 
par 392).  
4.4.2 Detention 
Powers to detain for the purpose of removal are rooted in the immigration Act 1971 as 
amended by the immigration and Asylum Act 1999. These allow for the detention of persons 
when there are ‘reasonable grounds for suspecting’ that they might be removed (Immigration 
Act 1971 Schedule 2 par 16(2)). This provision grants the UK authorities considerable 
discretion to detain migrants even when a removal or deportation decision has not been issued 
(Clayton and Firth 2018). In the case of deportation orders, there is an automatic duty to detain, 
unless it is decided as inappropriate by the Secretary of State (UK Borders Act s 32(5), s 36 
(2); IR 2018, par 382). In such a case, other restrictive measures may be applied, such as 
limiting a person to a ‘residence, employment or occupation, and requiring him to report to the 
police, pending the making of a deportation order’ (IR par 382).  
Similar to asylum-related detention, in addition to a realistic prospect of effecting removal, 
the criteria for decisions to detain are not provided in law but in policy guidelines issued by the 
Home Office (Home Office 2018d, par 55.1 Ch 55). The legal and policy framework concerning 
‘adults at risk’, children and families is that discussed in section 4.3.1.2. There is no right of 
appeal against removal-related detention (Clayton and Firth 2018). As with decisions to deport 
or remove, the only option is judicial review (Clayton and Firth 2018; House of Commons 
2017a). Provisions under the 1971 Immigration Act, which allowed First Tier Tribunal judges 
to release detainees on bail, were limited by the Immigration Acts of 2014 and 2016. The 
Immigration Act 2014 prohibits granting bail if there are removal orders and the removal is 
scheduled within 14 days and prohibits the hearing of a bail request within 28 days from the 
previous one (Immigration Act s 7; Amnesty International 2017). Before the enactment of the 
Immigration Act in 2018, detainees could be released on temporary admission, temporary 
release on bail and release on restrictions (Muzira 2018; Right to Remain 2018). The 2016 
Immigration Act unified these regimes into the status of immigration bail, which can be granted 
by a first -tier tribunal, the home secretary or a chief immigration officer (Schedule 10, par 1; 
House of Commons 2018b). It further introduced a wide -ranging regime of reporting 
obligations including restrictions to residence, curfews and the use of electronic tags to those 
released from detention (Immigration Act 2016, Schedule 10; Home Office 2018f).  
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Detention takes place in ‘Immigration Removal Centres’ (IRCs) as well as prisons in the 
case of migrants with criminal convictions waiting to be transferred to IRCs and those 
considered a security risk (NIAA 2002; House of Commons 2018b detention; Home Office 
2014a). Their operation, including the duties and responsibilities of personnel, is regulated by 
UK law and the 2001 Detention Centre Rules (IAA 1999; NIA 2002; Home Office 2001). There 
are currently 8 IRCs11, two short term holding facilities (in Northern Ireland and Manchester) 
and one pre-departure centre aimed at families (formerly Cedars and now Tinsley House) 
(House of Commons 2018b). In addition, there are short term detention sites in the juxtaposed 
controls areas in Calais, Dunkirk and Coquelles (Boswell 2016). There is no women-only IRC, 
although Yarl’s Wood is predominantly for women detainees and families (Yarl’s Wood 2019). 
Apart from two centres operated by the Prison Service, the operation of the rest has been 
outsourced to private companies (Clayton and Firth 2018; Shaw 2016). Depending on the 
facility, independent reviews are undertaken by the HM Inspectorate of Prisons, ICIBI and 
monitoring boards (House of Commons 2018b). 
4.4.3 Readmission  
The UK has opted into 14 out of the 21 current EU readmission agreements - Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, FYROM, Georgia, Hong Kong, Macao, Moldova, Montenegro, Pakistan, Russia, 
Serbia, Sri Lanka, Turkey and Ukraine (European Parliament 2018; Home Office 2014c). In 
addition to the EU readmission agreements, the UK has bilateral arrangements in the form of 
Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with six countries: Jordan, Libya, Lebanon, Ethiopia, 
Morocco and Afghanistan (House of Commons 2017a; UNHCR 2002). It further has an 
agreement with Algeria in the form of exchange of letters (House of Commons 2017a).  
Bilateral arrangements were an effort to bypass constraints by human rights obligations, 
in particular article 3 of the UN convention against torture and article 3 of the ECHR in an 
increasingly securitised and hostile context. These were upheld Chahal v UK judgment of the 
ECtHR, which found the UK in breach of these articles in the deportation case of a Sikh 
separatist (House of Commons 2017a).  
 
5. Key narratives of migration control  
Since the 1990s, political discourses on migration in the UK have been characterised by 
hostility directed in particular to unauthorised migration and migrants, including asylum 
seekers and refugees (Anderson 2013; Gabrielatos and Baker 2008; Bennet 2018; Jones et 
al 2017). Unauthorised migration has been constructed through narratives of illegality, burden, 
abuse and threat (Anderson 2013; Bennet 2018; Bosworth 2008; Gabrielatos and Baker 2008; 
Mulvey 2011; Jones et al 2017; Stewart and Mulvey 2014) which legitimate the introduction of 
ever increasing border management and control measures to prevent unauthorised arrivals.   
5.1 Controlling migration 
The analysis of texts for this report suggests that controlling migration is presented as an 
imperative for the British government (n=19), which is a long -established trope in British 
                                               
11 Two centres, Dover IRC and Haslar IRC, closed in 2015.  
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political discourse on migration (Bosworth 2008; Capdevilla and Callaghan 2008; Mulvey 
2011). In the words of PM May, ‘we must […] have an immigration system that allows us to 
control who comes to our country’ and control the country’s borders (The Independent 2015; 
also Home Office 2017g; 2015c). Commenting on the 2015 migration movements and the 
introduction of internal border controls in Schengen, she presented border controls at the 
national level as the only appropriate response:  
To those who say the problem is too great for nation states to resolve themselves, I 
say it can only be resolved by nation states taking responsibility themselves – and 
protecting their own national borders. (The Independent 2015) 
While on occasion, documents mention the participation of the UK in joint control efforts 
in the Mediterranean (Home Office 2015d; 2015c), controlling borders and migration is 
conceptualised as a right of the state and an activity guided by the national interest, which is 
presented as being at odds with EU policies (Home Office 2016f; Bennet 2018). While some 
of documents examined correspond to the 2015 events, there is a limited use of the frame of 
crisis (n=2), which is linked to development in other European countries (Home Office 2016f). 
One interpretation is that the UK is seen as far removed from Southern European borders 
(Home Office 2016f). Another explanation is the desire of the Conservative government to 
appear in control of migration, in contrast to the crisis discourse of other political actors, 
especially during the Brexit referendum (Bennet 2018).  
Narratives of migration control incorporate a number of tropes. First, they are concerned 
with preventing entry, a core notion of migration control (Anderson 2013; Boswell 2011). The 
aim of 2014 Immigration Act, according to a press release is to ‘limit the factors which draw 
illegal immigrants into the UK’ (Home Office 2014d), while the aim of controls at Calais is ‘to 
deter migrants from entering Britain’ (Home Office 2016f; see also Home Office 2013a; 2013b; 
2011a).  Another stated aim of control is to reduce net migration (Home Office 2013c; 2012b; 
2015e; 2017h), which reflects another key theme in British politics of migration, the 
preoccupation with the numbers of migrants arriving or staying in the country (Anderson 2013; 
Mulvey 2011).  
5.2 Securing the border 
The notion of the border features heavily in constructions of controlling migration. Border 
management and migration control measures introduced by the government are directly linked 
with a ‘safe’ and ‘secure’ border that needs to become even more so (Home Office 2012c; 
2015e). The establishment of the Border Force, for example, was argued to make the UK 
border ‘amongst the safest borders in the world’ (Home Office 2012d) while the opt in to the 
PNR directive is justified on the basis that PNR data is ‘a vital tool in securing our borders’ 
(Home Office 2011b). The juxtaposed border is again a key area, where the government 
‘invested tens of millions of pounds to bolster security at the ports’ (Home Office 2016g; 2016h; 
2011a). Thus, there is a close association between the border – which includes less tangible 
forms such as e-borders - and the notion of security (Vollmer 2019). The maintenance is an 
ongoing project requiring continuous policy efforts – the border is to become ‘more secure’ 
(Home Office 2016i; 2015e; 2016h). Border management and control policies are thus 
constructed as essential to protect the country against threats. 
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A safe and secure border means not just better immigration control, but safer streets 
and more secure citizens. There can be no compromises on border security. In a 
dangerous world, our border is one of our main protections (Home Office 2012c). 
5.3 Narratives of illegality and threat 
The perceived need to control the border and migration is legitimated by a number of 
narratives of implicit or explicit threats and illegality. Perceptions of threat are also supported 
by a narrative of illegality. The label ‘illegal immigrants’ is used extensively (n=20), while there 
is little evidence of use of more neutral labels such as ‘irregular or ‘undocumented’ migrants. 
Migrants stopped at the border or beyond it are designated as ‘illegal’ (Home Office 2011a; 
The Independent 2015), notwithstanding whether they are seeking protection.  ‘Illegal 
(im)migration’ is directly linked to smuggling – including in references to the 2015 migration 
movements – organised crime and terrorism (Home Office 2015c; Home Office 2015d). 
According to a 2011 press release, it must be ‘tackled’ along with ‘the criminal gangs behind 
it’ (Home Office 2012e; similarly, Home Office 2015f). Migrants arriving at the border without 
appropriate documentation are depicted as ‘a security risk as individuals wishing to come here 
for organised crime of terrorism purposes may view this as a potential method of entry’ (Home 
Office 2013d). Thus, terrorism and crime are constructed as interconnected with unauthorised 
migration movements, feeding into processes of securitising migration in the UK context 
(Boswell 2008; Squire 2015).  
In other documents constructions of threat pertain to broader conceptualisations. Prime 
Minister May for example mentioned effects of migration ‘on social cohesion, on our 
infrastructure and public services, and on jobs and wages’ to argue that it’s important that we 
do control immigration.’ The use of ‘we’ in her statement creates an impression of consensus 
(Wodak et al 2000; Van Dijk 1993), while the statement evokes threats to the economy, 
societal security and ethnic relations – suggested by the term social cohesion – and commonly 
shared resources. In another press release, ‘illegal working’ is argued to ‘cheat the taxpayer, 
has a negative impact on the wages of lawful workers and allows rogue employers to undercut 
legitimate businesses’ (Home Office 2017i; see also Home Office 2015c). While the theme of 
cultural threat does not feature prominently in the selected documents – it is mostly associated 
with integration – the themes of burden and economic threat reflect the emphasis placed on 
internal control measures targeting irregular employment.   
5.4 Narratives of abuse 
While the theme of abuse has been predominantly associated with asylum seeking in the 
British context (see Gabrielatos and Baker 2008; Tyler 2013; Mulvey 2011), it is also evident 
in relation to migration controls, with migrants depicted as ‘abusing’ policies of control – 
ranging from entry requirements to removal procedures (Home Office 2011c; 2012b; 2014e; 
2012f; e 2011d Green). One particular variant concerns the perceived abuse of the appeals 
system: 
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Should immigration detainees who have already been refused bail be permitted to 
make repeat applications day after day? The Bill will bring sense to the law in this area 
and stop this abuse (Home Office 2013c; also Home Office 2015g). 
Constructing the use of appeals rights against detention and removal betrays a hostility 
towards regimes of rights. In a 2014 speech, the then Home Office minister, T. May, stated 
that: 
We have changed the law to make clear to the courts that Article Eight of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the right to a family life, is a qualified and not an absolute 
right. We have changed the law to reduce the number of appeal rights in immigration 
law from seventeen down to four (Home Office 2014f). 
The tension between what is seen as imperative to control migration and regimes of 
human rights and international protection is a recurring theme in the documents analysed 
here, and the broader politics of migration in Britain (Anderson 2013; Mulvey 2011; Tyler 
2013).  Applying for protection, for example, is seen as a way to frustrate the process of 
removal, while the detention of asylum seekers ‘is an essential tool to help the agency process 
asylum claims quickly and effectively’ (Home Office 2012f). 
5.5 Protecting the public 
Another legitimating narrative consists of arguing that migration controls protect the public – 
which includes citizens but sometimes also ‘deserving’ migrants – from threats posed by 
migration (n=13). The following quote from a David Cameron 2015 speech exemplifies this 
trope: 
I said on the steps of Downing Street we would be a ‘one nation’ party. That means 
governing for every single person in Britain: for the mum worrying about her child 
getting a school place; for the pensioner fearing he won’t get the hospital appointment 
he needs; for the Asian family whose business is being undercut by illegal traders; for 
the young couple praying that someone won’t jump ahead of them on the housing list 
and yes – for the migrants trafficked here to live in appalling conditions on pitiful wages. 
We are for them. We are for working people. For them, we will control immigration 
(Home Office 2015c). 
Evoking various perceived threats faced by the public, Cameron depicts the government 
as their defender though controlling migration. While the above statement builds an inclusive 
body of people to be protected – regardless of class, ethnicity and migration status – other 
statement are less so, referring for example to ‘governments’ that ‘must exercise greater 
vigilance to keep their citizens safe from harm’ (Home Office 2011b). Such narratives thus 
reproduce national sovereignty, whereby the state is perceived as the protector of citizens 
(Castles 2003; Soguk 1999). References to the ‘public’ are also an entrenched trope in British 
political discourse that helps legitimate border and migration controls, and more specifically 
policies hostile to migration, by evoking the ’will of the people’ as a source of legitimacy for 






The Home Office is the Ministry that has overall responsibility for border management and 
migration control. Different agencies within the Home Office have responsibility over 
implementing different aspects of border and migration controls, frequently in cooperation with 
other state and non-state actors. 
• Border checks are currently conducted by the Border Force, and until 2012 the UK 
Border Agency.  
• Border Surveillance measures are conducted by the Border Force. Sea surveillance 
measures are also implemented by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and the 
Royal Navy. 
• The Home Office Visas and Immigration service oversees the visa application and 
entry clearance process as well as asylum related control functions such as the DFT 
and later Asylum Detention Casework.  
• Home Office Immigration Enforcement is responsible for internal control measures and 
removals. A number of subdivisions have responsibilities over specific aspects of 
implementation, such as the Family Return Panels, Immigration and Compliance 
Enforcement (ICE) teams, Detention Case Work teams. 
A number of other state agencies and public services are involved in the implementation 
of internal controls and apprehension measures, such as: 
• Police forces 
• The National Health Service (also responsible for commissioning healthcare in IRCs  
• The Department of Education, schools and universities 
• The Department of Work and Pensions 
• Local Authorities, in particular social services  
• Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) 
• The Driver and Vehicle Licencing Authority (DVLA) 
There is limited involvement of IGOs in border management and migration control, with 
the exception of IOM which implements assisted return programmes.  Likewise, the (at least 
formal) involvement of NGOs is limited, partly as many are reluctant to co-operate with the 
Home Office and ‘hostile environment’ policies (ICIBI 2016c). Two exceptions were 
Barnardo’s, a children-focused charity, which ran the now closed Cedars Immigration 
Removal Centre [IRC], and Refugee Action which ran an AVR programme between 2011 and 
2015 (Compas 2014; ICIBI 2015a).  
In contrast, there is extensive involvement of for-profit actors in all aspects of 
implementing border management and migration control policies, under outsourcing contracts 
with the Home Office.  
• In what concerns pre-entry controls, visa applications are processed by a private 
company, currently VFS Global.  
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• Private contractors (Tascor and Eamus Cork solutions) operate detention facilities at 
control zones in Calais (Boswell 2016).  
• Airlines operating both scheduled and charter flights are involved in API/PNR policies, 
as well as in removals (Corporate Watch 2018). 
• The Voluntary Returns hotline is run by Capita (ICIBI 2015a).  
• Security service companies such as G4S and Serco have been involved in running 
IRCs and removal operations (Corporate Watch 2018). Escorts for removals have 
been provided by Tascor (a subsidiary of Capita) and Mitie (ICIBI 2016c; Corporate 
Watch 2018). 
• Healthcare providers such as G4S Med-Co Secure and Tascor provide health services 
in detention centres (Shaw 2016; BMA 2017). 
• Travel agency Carlson Wagonlit Travel has provided tickets for removal flights (ICIBI 
2016c; Corporate Watch 2018).  
Private actors such as employers, banks and landlords have distinct responsibilities in 
implementing internal controls as discussed in section 4.3.2.  
6.2  Key issues in implementing border and migration  
controls 
6.2.1 Pre-entry 
The implementation of visa policies is beyond the scope of this report as it primarily concerns 
legal migration. From the perspective of allowing entry to the UK for the purpose of seeking 
protection, the complex system of visas for pre-admission – which in many instances does not 
constitute a guarantee that a person will be granted leave to enter at the border – renders 
access to the UK extremely difficult. While the PBS and family visas cater for economic and 
family migration respectively, both these categories and in particular visitor visas were 
informed by the policy aim to prevent unwanted immigration and asylum seeking (Clayton and 
Firth 2018; Partos and Bale 2015).  
One of the key issues regarding the implementation of carrier sanctions policies concerns 
the role of staff who implement migration controls and may be called to make decisions 
affecting access to UK territory, without necessarily having the training or expertise to consider 
human rights obligations (Nicholson 1987; Clayton and Firth 2018).  According to formal Home 
Office guidance they are not expected to act as immigration officers, although in practice such 
decisions have an impact on access to protection and safety (Bloom and Rise 2014; Scholten 
2015). Other implementation issues touch on the relation between state authorities and private 
actors. Changes to the level of penalties were opposed by carriers and criticised by the UK 
Regulatory Authority (Baird 2017; Regulatory Policy Committee 2013). Although the Home 
Office sought to increase fines through a consultation process in 2012 (EMN 2012; Home 
Office 2012g) there is no evidence that the proposed changes were carried through.   
While there is little information on the activities of Immigration Liaison Managers, Scholten 
(2015) has argued that while their role is advisory and they cannot make decisions on allowing 
passengers to embark, their advice tends to be followed by airlines.  The regime of carrier 
sanctions acts as a further contributing factor for carriers to preventing embarkation while 
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passengers have no right to appeal ILM’s or carriers’ decisions. Consequently, it has 
significant implications for reaching UK territory and applying for protection (Scholten 2015). 
There are also concerns regarding the dual role of ILMs in controlling migration but also being 
involved in crime prevention and enforcement activities (Home Office 2016j; 2012a). 
In what concerns the implementation of API and passenger information provisions, issues 
have been raised in relation to the Home Office’s system Semaphore, which is used to 
manage API & PNR data (NAO 2017; Police Scotland 2018).  The system is used to check for 
information on ‘persons of interest’, including those who are deemed to pose a threat to 
national security (ICIBI 2018a; NAO 2017:15; Police Scotland 2018). Despite its many failures 
(ICIBI 2018a; The Guardian 2015) it can thus be used to prevent entry if, for instance, a person 
seeking international protection, is also identified as a ‘person of interest’ in Semaphore. 
Further, while it is presented as a border control instrument, police forces have access to it 
(Police Scotland 2018), illustrating the nexus between border management and migration 
control activities on the one hand, and law enforcement of the other. 
6.2.2. Border checks and surveillance 
UK law does not stipulate a border asylum procedure and asylum applications are submitted 
and examined by the Home Office Visas and Immigration inland (AIDA 2017).  Thus, there is 
little information on the impact of border or entry checks on access to international protection, 
while official bodies such as ICIBI and National Audit Office inspections are largely concerned 
with security and customer relations issues (ICIBI 2018b; 2018c; 2017a).  Yet, some reports 
note inadequacies in the manner that Border Force personnel address potential vulnerable 
migrants such as child victims of trafficking, who might have claims to international protection 
(ICIBI 2018c; 2017a). The Exit Checks system introduced in 2015 was criticised by ICIBI for 
weaknesses in data collection but after an initial pilot phase it was rolled out by the Home 
Office (ICIBI 2018a; Home Office 2018j).  
The implementation of border management policies and border checks in the context of 
‘juxtaposed controls’ has, however, along with pre-entry measures, significant impact on the 
possibility of accessing UK territory for asylum (AIDA 2017; Migration Observatory 2014).  
Juxtaposed controls explicitly target unauthorised migration into the UK (Bosworth 2016; 
Clayton and Firth 2018; Home Office 2017b). UK border control arrangements in cooperation 
with the French authorities, including the dismantling of camps, practices of detention, and 
‘handing over’ asylum applicants to French authorities, have had a significant impact in 
restricting the possibility of applying for international protection in the UK (Mc Donnell 2018; 
Reinisch 2015; Welander 2019). Further, one of the effects of implementing policies of 
juxtaposed controls was the displacement of migration movements to other routes – through 
Belgium, other areas of France - rather than succeeding in preventing entry to the UK (ICIBI 
2018b; House of Commons 2016a). Other issues related to implementation have been a lack 
of procedures for responding to vulnerable groups, including unaccompanied minors 
(Bosworth 2016; Interview, Just Right Scotland), shortcoming in terms of documenting 
decisions regarding entry and detention (ICIBI 2013a) and a lack of cooperation from the 
French authorities (House of Commons 2016a).  
In response to the 2015 ‘crisis’ – concerning mainly the camps in Calais - the government 
decided to strengthen control and surveillance measures through increased investment and 
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deployment of police in control zones (House of Commons 2016b; 2017b). While powers of 
maritime surveillance increased by the Immigration Act 2016, the implementation of these 
provisions appeared to be hindered by a lack of resources such as patrol vessels (House of 
Commons 2016b; 2017b). UK vessels participated in the EUNVFOR MED and Sophia 
operations (House of Commons 2016a) as part of the UK’s cooperation with Frontex. 
  
6.2.3 Internal controls: Stay, internal control and apprehension  
measures 
6.2.3.1 Stay 
In relation to conditions of stay of recipients of international protection, a report by the Chief 
Inspector of Borders and Migration found significant inconsistencies in the application of 
cessation and revocation provisions by two different Home Office units involved in the process, 
the Status Review Unit and the Cancelation Cessation and Revocation (CCR) team with 
criminal Casework (ICIBI 2017b; McKinney 2018). While the first withdrew protection status in 
25 cases between January 2015 and March 2017, the latter, which has responsibility over 
migrants who have committed criminal offenses, did so in 309 cases (McKinney 2018). The 
discrepancy illustrates that safety in the country of origin is interpreted differently by 
caseworkers, and that CCR prioritised considerations of criminality and security, and removed 
refugee status even for minor offences (McKinney 2018). This has significant implications, as 
it renders individuals liable to be removed (ICIBI 2017b). The report also noted the absence 
of communication between the two units (ICIBI 2017b). Other implementation problems have 
included delays and errors in issuing the Biometric Residence Permits attached to the 5-year 
leave to remain status (APPG 2017; British Red Cross 2014). In what concerns travel 
documents, the Home Office has on occasions denied their issuance on the grounds of 
security threats, but without these being communicated to the applicant or their legal 
representatives (Wilsons 2017).  
The detention of asylum seekers under the Detained Fast Track system was criticised for 
prioritising administrative convenience over both legal stipulations and human and asylum 
rights considerations (House of Commons 2015a; Liberty 2019; Shaw 2016; Interview, Asylum 
Welcome) and was suspended in 2015 after legal challenges. Practices of detention are often 
contradictory to the Home Office guidance discussed in section 4.3.1.2 (AIDA 2017). Analysis 
of casework decisions by Amnesty International has shown that factors that would weigh 
against detention – such as a realistic chance of removal, experiences of torture, health and 
mental health conditions or the welfare of children – are disregarded in decision making 
processes, at odds with the Home Office’s Adult at Risk Policy (Amnesty International 2017; 
AIDA 2017). Given the wide-ranging powers to detain with a view to removal, asylum seekers 
can be detained for the duration of their claims (Clayton and Firth 2018).  Women asylum 
seekers are regularly detained even despite being victims of gendered and other forms of 
violence (Asylum Aid 2018).  
In what concerns migrants with no legal status, the further curtailment of rights introduced 
under the ‘hostile environment’ policy did have significant effects in producing illegality. This 
was the case, for example, with the Windrush Scandal, whereby long-term residents and 
citizens were illegalised by both changes in legislation but also the implementation of checks 
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by employers, the NHS and other public authorities. Communication of information between 
the Home Office, DWP and employers has a significant impact on the livelihood of irregularly 
employed migrants, facing destitution because of their status (Liberty 2018).  However, 
research has demonstrated that despite the expansion of bordering practices and controls, 
migrants with no status adopt strategies that allow then to work and live in the UK, albeit in 
conditions of insecurity and rights violations (Bloch, Sigona and Zetter 2014; Duvell, Cherti 
and Lapshyna 2018).  
6.2.3.2 Apprehension and internal control measures 
In terms of enforcement, the expansion of apprehension and internal control measures since 
2014 has been characterised both by implementation problems and human rights issues. 
Cooperation between Home Office and the Police has been established for a longer period 
than with public agencies and combined apprehension measures performed by the police – 
such as raids, stop and searches and ID checks – with the Home Office policy aim of 
expanding deportation and removal (Home Office 2016k; House of Commons 2017a). The 
flagship project of this category was Operation Nexus, which started in 2012 in London and 
was gradually implemented in other areas of the UK (House of Commons 2017a; ICIBI 2016b; 
2014a).  It targeted ‘foreign offenders’ who were arrested or identified as ‘high harm’ – a term 
referring to conduct that ‘incurs significant adverse impact, whether physical, emotional or 
financial, upon individuals or the wider community’ (Duvell, Cherti and Lapshyna 2018). This 
definition was criticised for vagueness that led to a focus on low-level criminality as well (Home 
Office 2015b; Ikegwuruka 2017).  In fact, the Home Office response to the ICIBI report 
indicated that interpretations of ‘high harm’ differed among police forces (Home Office 2016k). 
However, a legal challenge to Operation Nexus was unsuccessful, as the court upheld the 
legality of using police enforcement powers for immigration purposes (House of Commons 
2017a).  
The impact of initiatives such as Operation Nexus and the broader statutory obligations 
for cooperation between the Home Office and the Police was illustrated by one of the 
stakeholders: 
the lady who’s staying with me at the moment was also picked up and taken to 
Dungavel and that was very shocking because she was being interviewed by the police 
and […] and another woman had accused her of pushing her, or something, and the 
police interviewed her and they said, well, oh, this seems like nonsense, it’s just two 
women falling out.  You know, there’s nothing to it. And then they said to her, you know, 
and where do you live […] then it came out that she was a failed asylum seeker, and 
they phoned the Home Office. (Interview, Maryhill Integration Centre)   
Similar to the criticisms raised in relation to operation Nexus, this example illustrates 
involvement with police, even for insignificant events, can lead to detention and potentially 
deportation.  
Measures concerning ‘illegal working’ have been equally contentious. A pilot operation 
conducted in 2014, ‘Skybreaker’ was ostensibly focused on community engagement, with 
emphasis placed on informing employers of their legal obligations, rather than immigration 
enforcement (ICIBI 2015b; Yuval-Davis, Wemyss and Costello 2018). According to the Home 
Office, it increased voluntary returns. Yet, this objective was seen by ground -level personnel 
 40 
as ‘cost-cutting’, undermining the aim of immigration enforcement (Yuval-Davis, Wemyss and 
Costello 2018: 234). Further, Operation Skybreaker took place in some of the most ethnically 
diverse boroughs in London, raising concerns over racism and the impact on local 
communities (Yuval-Davis, Wemyss and Costello 2018; Duvell, Cherti and Lapshyna 2018). 
Operational guidance given by the Home Office was deemed insufficient and unclear by ICIBI 
(2015b), which also raised concerns over the adherence of ICE officers to legal requirements 
and guidance, including the use of warrants, informed consent to entering premises, 
apprehending ‘suspects’, enforcement powers such as questioning and handcuffing, 
safeguarding and record-keeping (ICIBI 2015b; Duvell, Cherti and Lapshyna 2018; Liberty 
2018). Other criticisms raised concern the use of intelligence which often consisted of 
unreliable and incomplete information given by members of the public (Duvell, Cherti and 
Lapshyna 2018; ICIBI 2015b). Further, employers, especially small businesses, do not 
necessarily have the resources or knowledge to implement the type of checks required by law, 
prioritise economic considerations, or even oppose migration control measures (Duvell, Cherti 
and Lapshyna 2018). While civil penalties concerning illegal working have increased, they are 
not always collected by the Home Office or reduced in contradiction to existing guidance 
(Aliverti 2016; House of Commons 2016c; ICIBI 2015b). 
Another flagship ‘hostile environment’ policy, the obligation imposed on landlords to check 
immigration status, resulted in 265 civil penalties by 2017, but has been characterised by 
miscommunications among Home Office divisions responsible for implementing it, insufficient 
guidance and consequently knowledge of the policy by implementing divisions, lack of 
meaningful engagement and communication with landlords, and insufficient evaluation and 
monitoring. (ICIBI 2018d). More importantly, migrant support organisations raised concerns 
over the potential for discrimination by landlords and effects on homelessness (ICIBI 2018d; 
Duvell, Cherti and Lapshyna 2018). In 2019, the High Court confirmed the validity of those 
concerns, ruling that the Right to Rent scheme was unlawful and incompatible with the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (The Guardian 2019). Similarly, the implementation provisions concerning 
bank accounts and driving licenses bans were characterised by errors, leading to penalisation 
of persons wrongly identified (House of Lords 2018a; ICIBI 2016a). 
The implementation of the provision for the public sector to provide information to the 
Home Office has been particularly contentious. In practical terms, it has taken the form of data-
sharing arrangements between the Home Office and other ministries or agencies.  The 
Department of Education entered such an agreement in 2015 obliging schools to provide it 
with data on the nationality of students (Home Office 2015i; Guardian 2016; Liberty 2018). 
While this was ostensibly for educational purposes, it allowed for the DfE to pass on 
information to the Home Office which could be used for enforcement (Guardian 2016; Liberty 
2018; House of Lords 2018a). The agreement was scrapped in 2018 after public outcry (The 
Guardian 2018b). A similar memorandum of understanding was entered with the NHS 
concerning the sharing of immigration data of patients and was again withdrawn in 2019 
(Home Office 2016l; 2019c; Wemyss 2018). A participant who worked for two major destitution 
and healthcare focused NGOs observed that recent legal changes were 
extending borders into social work and healthcare […] And that was something we 
definitely saw in social work, working with social workers in X and having real concerns 
about information sharing between the local authority and the Home Office […] I know 
it happens in education and police, but I think social work would be the one that is 
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actually most frightening because of the implications it has for children and potentially 
parents […] (Interview, Red Cross former employee) 
Similarly, an ICIBI report on such arrangements demonstrates that information was 
passed between agencies and the Home Office, despite the unclear aims of such 
arrangements and major concerns regarding their impact on migrants’ – and in the case of 
Windrush generation, citizens’ rights – and the practices of the Home Office vis-à-vis 
cooperating partner authorities (ICIBI 2019a). However, responses by the Home Office in the 
ICIBI report suggest that such arrangements have been scaled down or amended rather than 
stopped (ICIBI 2019a).  
While the measures discussed above primarily targeted migrant populations deemed 
deportable, they are also exercised on asylum seekers. While there is no prohibition to 
travelling within the UK (see section 4.3.1.2), the Home Office has tracked journeys made by 
asylum seekers outside their city of dispersal through their use of the ‘Aspen’ card – the debit 
card which contains the allowance provided to asylum seekers. Subsequently, asylum seekers 
had benefits removed as a penalty for breaking rules attached to the provision of 
accommodation and income support (The Independent 2019; Right to Remain 2019).  
 
6.2.4 Return, readmission and detention 
6.2.4.1 Return and readmission 
There are two broad areas of issues raised in relation to the implementation of deportation 
and removal law and policy, touching respectively on efficiency and human rights issues. 
Reports by formal scrutiny institutions and parliamentary committees largely emphasise the 
organisational and logistical inefficiencies related to the perceived imperative of deporting 
‘foreign criminals’ or persons without legal status (House of Commons 2017a; 2015b; NAO 
2015; ICIBI 2015a), rather than the human rights implications of removal12. In fact, these 
reports considered human rights instruments and appeal provisions as impediments to powers 
to deport or remove (NAO 2015).   
Poor communication and cooperation among Home Office divisions and different 
understanding of policy priorities have been argued to undermine the implementation of 
removals policies and increase costs (Duvell, Cherti and Lapshyna 2018; NAO 2015; ICIBI 
2015a; House of Commons 2015b). For example, Noticed and Confirmed removals were 
prioritised over assisted returns in an effort to meet targets, despite the fact that enforced 
removals are generally costlier than voluntary returns (ICIBI 2015a; IPPR 2013). Cooperation 
between the Home Office and the police – in their capacity of identifying migrants liable to 
deportation or removal – have also been criticised (NAO 2015). Lack of cooperation from third 
countries – for example in issuing travel documents – was identified as another factor 
                                               
12 For example, the ICIBI report on removals (2015) criticises the Family Returns process for 
prioritising ‘easier’ family cases over complex refused asylum seeker families cases, without referring 
on human rights issues or risks upon return.  
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preventing the implementation of deportation and removal policies (House of Commons 
2017a; NAO 2015).   
The capacity of the Home Office to manage efficiently the removal system has frequently 
been called into doubt (ICIBI 2016c; House of Commons 2016b; House of Commons 2015b). 
One of the frequently repeated criticisms is the reliance on incomplete or low -quality data 
(Migration Observatory 2016; House of Commons 2015b). Administrative deficiencies and 
lack of capacity were seen as preventing the full use of deportation and removal powers and 
resulting in delays in removal processes (House of Commons 2015b; 2017a; NAO 2015).  
Lack of clear Home Office guidance in certain areas – such as how to deal with ‘non-compliant 
children’ – is identified as affecting implementation (ICIBI 2015a:6). In a similar vein, one of 
the interviews stakeholders, a NHS doctor, expressed the belief that Home Office do not have 
the capacity to implement removals to the extent they wish to (Interview, doctor, NHS).    
The involvement of for-profit actors through outsourcing contracts has been contentious, 
noting the failure of the Home Office to manage the process effectively or supervise the 
activities of the private contractors (ICIBI 2016c). The private contracting of removal flights 
tickets and escorts for example, both increased costs and delayed removal schedules 
because of the lack of coordination (ICIBI 2016c). According to data released under Freedom 
of Information requests, the number of people removed through charter flights is significantly 
lower than originally planned (Home Office 2018k; Home Office 2016m).  
The politically-led drive for increasing returns has translated into both law and policies that 
often disregard human rights. UK law on deportation and removal leaves a lot of discretion to 
the executive, in this case the Home Office, to interpret and implement legal provisions. The 
interpretation of the right to family life under Article 8 of the ECHR is, at a first stage, the remit 
of the Home Office. Although UK courts elaborated in cases such as RU (Bangladesh) v SSDH 
and Masih (deportation-public interest-basic principles) Pakistan [2012] UKUT 00046 (IAC) 
balancing the public interest stipulation with ECHR Article 8 rights has remained problematic 
(Clayton and Firth 2018). Weak safeguards are another detrimental factor. As Home Office 
(2015b: 13) guidance states, the burden of proof to demonstrate why a deportation order 
breaches human rights or convention grounds is on the applicant deportee (also interview, 
Voluntary organisation, London). Thus, legal provisions have been found contrary to 
international and domestic human rights law by courts. The Supreme Court in R (Kiarie and 
Byndloss) v Secretary of State for the Home Office found the certification of appeals under 
NIAA 2002 unlawful on the grounds that it does not provide a meaningful right of appeal and 
breaches Article 8 of ECHR (Clayton and Firth 2018; Jones 2018). The rights of British family 
members have often been violated in the process (Griffiths and Morgan 2017). While the 
provision remains in law, the Supreme Court case limited the scope for ‘deport first, appeal 
later’ practices (Jones 2018). 
The scope of human rights violations engendered by the British enforcement and justice 
system is equally significant. One of the criticisms addressed to Operation Nexus, discussed 
in the previous section, was that it targeted third country nationals on the basis of charges or 
police reports. Such information was passed to the Home Office for deportation, even in the 
absence of criminal conviction (House of Commons 2017a). According to a Home Office 
statement, it specifically targeted ‘those lawfully here (both EU and non-EU nationals) but 
whose conduct merits their removal or deportation from the United Kingdom’ (Home Office 
2014g:2). The Home Office tried to deport stateless people and victims of trafficking, both 
against policy and law (The Guardian 2018c). An interviewee referred to a case of a human 
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trafficking victim who was found guilty of drug offences related to his trafficking. He was to be 
deported on the grounds of the criminal offense, despite applying for asylum (Interview, 
Councillor, Green Party).  Equally questionable is the practice of removing refused asylum 
seekers to countries with widespread conflict and violence, such as Afghanistan; as one 
stakeholder observed, Foreign Office guidance advises British citizens against travelling there 
at the same time that Home Office guidance allows for deportations (Interview, Voluntary 
Organisation, London).  
Research has also shown that there are significant risks of rights violations post 
deportation, given the lack of interest or scrutiny of what happens after removal (Onyoin 2017; 
Schuster and Majidi 2015). AVR projects have been critiqued for not being truly voluntary as 
migrants, including unaccompanied minors, are forced to return contrary to their wishes 
(Robinson and Williams 2015). In the case of the Refugee Action programme Choices, Afghani 
unaccompanied minors were offered training in exchange for signing up to AVRs, but this 
conditionality led to the failure of the project (Robinson and Williams 2015). In what concerns 
readmission, bilateral Memoranda of understanding have been extensively criticised. While 
the UK government position has been that they allow them to obtain assurances regarding the 
treatment of removed nationals of these countries, these assurances provide an insufficient 
level of human rights guarantees since they are not binding in law (Grozdanova 2015; House 
of Commons 2017a; Liberty 2017). Further, some of the countries with which the UK has 
entered MoUs have regimes which violate human rights, to the extent that arrangements with 
Libya were ‘deemed insufficient protection’ by a House of Commons report (House of 
Commons 2017a; Liberty 2017b).  
6.2.4.2 Detention 
The expanding use of detention attracted considerable criticism regarding its implementation 
and shortcomings in terms of human rights safeguards (Amnesty International 2017; House 
of Commons 2015a; British Red Cross 2018; Shaw 2016). One criticism is that the stated goal 
of using detention sparingly is undermined by the relevant Home Office guidance, which is 
geared towards privileging detention decisions, despite stating that ‘detention should be used 
sparingly, and for the shortest period necessary’ (Home Office 2018d). While referring to 
individual assessment, EIG guidance directs caseworkers in favour of detention by 
emphasising generalised risks of absconding and harm to the public (Amnesty international 
2017; House of Commons 2015a). Factors that could lead to not detaining or ending detention 
such as how realistic the prospect of removal is– for example if travel documents have not 
been secured – or welfare and health considerations are not always taken into account in 
decision making (Amnesty International 2017; House of Commons 2015a). Further, 
alternatives to detention are not fully considered despite the fact that they might be more cost 
efficient and effective in terms of compliance (House of Commons 2015a; Red Cross 2018). 
Yet, lack of detention spaces was found to lead to decisions not to detain (ICIBI 2015a 
removal), despite the utilisation of prisons for detention for immigration offences (Interview, 
voluntary Sector, London). 
Given the wide statutory powers to detain granted by British law, the key issue relating to 
implementation is when a detention order is unlawful or can be challenged legally (Clayton 
and Firth 2018). Several court judgements challenged decisions to detain because of failures 
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to follow legal provisions but also adherence to policy guidance13. Yet, the scope for allowing 
challenges to detention decisions is limited (Interview Voluntary Sector Organisation, London). 
As there is no automatic appeal right or judicial oversight dictated by the legal framework, it is 
down to detainees to challenge their detention (House of Commons 2015a; Interview, 
Voluntary Sector Organisation, London). This is impeded by shortcomings in accessing legal 
aid, which in detention centres in England and Wales is available through legal aid contracts 
(House of Commons 2015a; Shaw 2016; Interview, Voluntary Sector Organisation, London; 
interview Asylum Support). Even in Scotland, where lawyers can access migrants in detention, 
the remote location of Dungavel IRC has been raised as an impediment to legal support 
(Interview JA). Practices that exacerbates access to legal and other support for migrants is 
that of detaining in IRCs far from the detainees’ place of residence or moving them between 
centres (House of Commons 2015a; Shaw 2016). Stakeholders brought up several examples:    
The Home Office said put her in a cell and we’ll collect her in the morning. They put her in 
a police cell with no food, no water, nothing, overnight, and in the morning the Home Office 
picked her up and took her to Dungavel. [….]  she was then transferred to Yarl’s Wood 
down at Bedford (interview Maryhill Integration Centre). 
They took her down to England.  Of course, that’s crafty then because the Scottish lawyer 
can’t operate, you have to get an English lawyer, and we got an English lawyer but they 
still deported her (interview Maryhill Integration Centre). 
He was moved on the Saturday morning down to a detention centre in England on 
Saturday morning so that he couldn’t get in touch with his lawyer of course. (Interview, 
Councillor, Green Party). 
The immigration bail system, in addition, has been criticised for privileging detention rather 
than release, often on unsubstantiated reasons (House of Commons 2015a; Shaw 2016). 
Further, a number of reports and legal cases have raised concerns regarding conditions 
of detention. Conditions at IRCs have been described as prison-like; some were previously 
used as prisons (Boswell and Slade 2014; House of Commons 2015a). Apart from insufficient 
access to legal aid, deficiencies identified include access to interpretation and healthcare and 
their lack of adequacy (House of Commons 2016; Red Cross 2018; Shaw 2016). Restrictions 
to the use of mobile phones and the internet also impede communication (House of Commons 
2015a; Red Cross 2018). Detention conditions often disproportionately affect women (Boswell 
and Slade 2014). A stakeholder raised this issue in relation to Dungavel IRC: 
The problem with Dungavel is there’s about 100 men there and only two dormitories for women 
with, I think, eight women in each dormitory and so ... she said when they went to get their 
meals, they felt like chickens walking through foxes, you know. Apparently, they used to collect 
their food and they were allowed to take it into the lounge. They didn’t actually eat it in the 
dining room with all these men staring at them. And there is a little exercise yard/garden and 
I said did you go out and get some fresh air?  Oh no, because all the men go out there 
(Interview Maryhill Integration Centre). 
 
                                               
13 Such as Tan te Lam v SSDH and R (on the application of I) v SSDH (In R v SSDH [2011] EWHC 
2249, R v SSDH ex p Khan [1985], Karas and Miladinovic [2006] and Kambadzi v SSDH [2011] 
Medical Justice & Ors v SSDH [2017] (Clayton and Firth 2018). 
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The issues raised by the stakeholder are mirrored in other reports, which documented 
instances of sexual harassment by IRC staff and practices such as body searches by male 
staff (House of Commons 2015a; Shaw 2016). 
Practices related to the detention of vulnerable groups, including pregnant women and 
children, has been an area that attracted particular criticism, even after the introduction of the 
‘Adults at Risk’ policy. Women who are survivors of gendered forms of violence and torture 
are regularly detained (Asylum Aid 2018; Shaw 2016). Particularly controversial has been the 
detention of survivors of torture, rape and trafficking and persons with mental health conditions 
(Asylum Aid 2018; House of Commons 2016c; House of Commons 2015a). The use of Article 
35 of the Detention Centre Rules 2001 in identifying vulnerable persons who should not be 
detained has been largely ineffective (Amnesty international 2017; Shaw 2016; Interview, 
Councillor Green Party; Interview, voluntary Sector Organisation, London). Further, there is 
no mechanism to evaluate the implementation of the Adults at Risk-policy (Asylum Aid 2018). 
While one interviewee has observed that the detention of children has been reduced 
(interview, Partner, Just Right Scotland), children are still detained despite calls to change this 
practice by official inquiries and NGOs (Amnesty International 2017; Shaw 2016). Similarly, 
there is no statutory duty for the Home Office to follow the recommendations of the 
Independent Family Returns-Panel - which advises the Home Office on family returns - 
regarding detention, thus rendering legal stipulation on taking into account the welfare of 
children ineffective (Clayton and Firth 2018). 
Given that many services are contracted out, the role of private contractors has been 
associated with both shortcomings in services and human rights abuses such as the 
mistreatment of detainees (Home Office 2018l; Shaw 2016). While for-profit actors are 
contracted to provide services – ranging from security to healthcare - they are also considered 
public authorities in the context of detention, alongside the Home Office (Clayton and Firth 
2018). This has implications for obligations under the Human Rights Act 1998 and the 
Detention Rules, for example, in providing adequate healthcare serves as contracted or 
mistreating detainees (Clayton and Firth 2018). Contracted staff has been criticised both for 
lacking training and operating based on a culture of disbelief towards reported health and 
mental health problems (House of Commons 2015a; Shaw 2016). In the words of one 
stakeholder, ‘there are concerns that private contractors engage in human rights abuses in 
the context of running those detention centres, also in the context of enforcing removals’ 
(Interview, Partner, Just Right Scotland).  
 
6.3 Relations among actors 
One area that has been identified is poor communication and cooperation among the different 
Home Office divisions involved in the implementation of different policies (Duvell, Cherti and 
Lapshyna 2018; House of Commons 2015b; ICIBI 2018d; 2016b; 2016c; 2015a). The 
identified causes for these difficulties are numerous: logistical constraints – for example 
detention capacity – lack of coordination, different priorities, a culture of targets, and 
insufficient knowledge of government policy and initiatives (House of Commons 2015b; ICIBI 
2015a; 2016b; 2016c; 2018d).  Research has also highlighted the perception of immigration 
officers that the highly centralised yet complex structure and organisation of Home Office 
enforcement units has undermined capacity for cooperation and the role of both local 
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intelligence and experience, and the professionalism of immigration enforcement officers 
(Duvell, Cherti and Lapshyna 2018). Organisational change, driven by political demands was 
identified as a further factor undermining relations between the Home Office and immigration 
enforcement personnel, often leading to low morale (Duvell, Cherti and Lapshyna 2018). 
Accounts of the cooperation between the police and immigration officers are generally 
contradictory. Sometimes they suggest effective cooperation (Duvell, Cherti and Lapshyna 
2018; Interview, Social worker). One stakeholder in Scotland, for example, pointed to good 
working arrangements between social work services and the Border force in one of the major 
airports (Interview, Social Worker). However, they also point to different agendas, priorities 
and work cultures, as well as strongly opposing Home Office agendas, policies and work 
practices (Duvell, Cherti and Lapshyna 2018; interview, Social Worker; Interview, Police 
Scotland). This is also true in the case of private actors such as employers and landlords 
(Duvell, Cherti and Lapshyna 2018; ICIBI 2015b; ICIBI 2018d). Similarly, implementing AVR 
programmes raised concerns over the lack of their promotion by Home Office Departments 
(ICIBI 2015a).  
However, the main reason stakeholders were critical of migration control policies and 
practices was because they undermined their service provision objectives of public authorities 
and conflicted with their professional ethics (also Duvell, Cherti and Lapshyna 2018). A police 
respondent raised the issue of maintaining the trust of migrants in their multiple roles in dealing 
with crime, participating in integration initiatives and doing enforcement work (Interview, Police 
Scotland). A social worker similarly argued that ‘our role is to support people, not to try to make 
life so uncomfortable for them that they don’t want to be here and they’ll go home’ (Interview, 
Social Worker).  
The ‘hostile environment’ policy in particular is pointed as a factor for the worsening of 
relations between enforcement and other public agencies. In the words of a stakeholder: 
R: Hostile environment.  So this guy comes to meet us.  I’ve been appointed to work 
with you, to help create this hostile environment.  These are the things we want to do 
and, you know, you need to work with us…and I’m sitting there going to him, I’m a 
social worker. What you’re asking me to do to people is inhumane. It would be against 
my code of conduct in terms of my professional conduct to behave that way. […] What 
you’re asking us both professionally and as a local authority to do is completely at odds 
with what we are meant to do.  (interview, Social Worker) 
Echoing the opposition to Home Office MoUs with other ministries and agencies regarding 
immigration enforcement (see section 4.3.2), a doctor and voluntary worker, clearly suggested 
that opposition to Home Office policies because of their incompatibility to professional ethics 
has led to partial non-compliance. Commenting on the duty to report, she stated that while 
she would cooperate if safeguarding was the aim of Home Office or police requests but:  
If they’re wanting to arrest people, I’ll say you have no right to know that […] If we know 
the patient, I’ll get the message to them telling them that you’re looking for them […] 






7. Conclusion and recommendations 
The UK context presents certain particularities in terms of legal arrangements and policy 
practices. Given its island geography, the UK border is better conceptualised as an 
amalgamation of border check points – both in ports within the UK territory and beyond such 
as in France and Belgium but also in consular services worldwide – and ‘smart borders’ relying 
on the use of information technologies and information databases (Vaughn Williams 2010; 
Vollmer 2019). British border management practices rely heavily on pre-entry measures such 
as API and PNR information, the visa and entry clearance regime and biometric data, which 
prevent access to UK territory and produce the information that enables the conduct of at-the-
border checks as well as internal controls, detention and return. There is considerable 
continuity among the different domains of control examined in this report. Data collected and 
stored through information technologies and databases before and at the border feed into both 
the exercise of internal control measures and return and deportation.  
The UK border management and migration control regime is characterised by a high level 
of complexity of law and policy. There are at least 15 statutes regulating migration, in addition 
to statutory instruments implementing legislation (both domestic and EU), other legislative acts 
pertaining to criminal law, and the Immigration and Detention rules (Clayton and Firth 2018; 
Law Commission 2019). According to research done by the Guardian, there have been around 
5,700 changes in the IR, which doubled in length (The Guardian 2018d). Added to these is a 
great number of Home Office guidance documents concerning the implementation of legal 
provisions (Home Office 2019d). Equally, the implementation of policies encompasses 
agreements between the Home Office and public authorities, which are subject to change and 
often not easy to access, as well as arrangements between the Home Office and private 
contractors.  
This complexity explains some of the implementation issues raised by stakeholders and 
existing research, concerning efficiency, co-operation and communication among both Home 
Office agencies and between the Home Office and other actors, and as well as lack of 
comprehensive and reliable data (ICIBI 2016c; 2016b). Yet as Boswell (2011) suggest, a lack 
of data can serve UK policy aims. More significantly, a consistent theme concerning the 
implementation of legal provisions is the non-adherence of Home Office actors, such as case 
workers and ICE personnel, to the ministry’s own guidance – albeit often unclear – or its 
application in an inconsistent manner (from example, Amnesty International 2017; Clayton 
and Firth 2018; ICIBI 2015b; Shaw 2016).  
There are considerable tensions between human rights and asylum obligations on the one 
hand, and the border management and migration control regime on the other. As in many 
national contexts and EU wide, border management and migration controls in the UK result in 
human rights violations and inhibit access to protection (Bosworth 2016). The extensive 
overlap between migration and criminal law and the criminalisation of migration (Provera 
2015). Practices undertaken during the process of unauthorised migration – unauthorised 
entry, the use of forged documents or not having documents – are not merely administrative 
offences but criminal ones. The expansion of both migration and criminal offences has led to 
widening the scope for border and migration control (Aliverti 2015; Ikegwuruka 2017), a 
development which has underpinned the expansion of powers and practices of detention, 
deportation and removal (Ikegwuruka 2017). This is also evident at the discursive level, where 
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migration control is continuously linked to crime and security threats. Political agendas, in 
particular the ‘hostile environment’, have had an adverse impact on policy implementation. 
Especially at the level of devolved administration structures, it has created tensions among 
public agencies operating at the local level, and the centralised agendas and command of the 
Home Office (Duvell, Cherti and Lapshyna 2018; interview SB; Interview police). These were 
seen as undermining work with migrant communities, leading to distrust and thus rendering 
the immigration enforcement work of public agencies more difficult (Duvell, Cherti and 
Lapshyna 2018; interview SB; Interview police). The implementation of deportation and 
removal policies frequently disregards human rights and protection claims, exacerbated by a 
political drive to increase their rate and a focus on criminality while simultaneously weakening 
legal safeguards (Ikegwuruka 2017). 
The UK context is also characterised by an active hostility and opposition to human rights 
and asylum regimes. At the government level, this is manifested in ‘hostile environment’ 
policies such as the near-extinction of the appeals system and limiting the scope for judicial 
review. Public bodies with responsibility over evaluating policy such as the NAO and House 
of Commons Committees have considered human rights obligations and legal safeguards 
such as appeals and judicial reviews as impediments to migration control, especially in relation 
to the deportation, removal and detention regime (ICIBI 2015a; NAO 2015). These views are 
also shared by immigration enforcement personnel (Duvell, Cherti and Lapshyna 2018).  
Further, the ‘hostile environment’ policies considered in this report have had an extremely 
negative and widespread impact. They curtailed the rights and increased the insecurity of one 
of the most vulnerable groups in the UK – migrants with no legal status – but also had adverse 
consequences on migrants in general regardless of status (Yuval-Davis, Wemyss and 
Costello 2018). Such consequences range from erroneously excluding refugees and migrants 
from rental accommodation and opening bank accounts to the criminalisation and penalisation 
of predominantly non-white British residents and citizens (House of Lords 2018a; United 
Nations 2018). There has been a limited acknowledgment of these implications by the UK 
government, and no indication that they have led to a reconsideration of ‘hostile environment’ 
measures.  
Given the findings of this report, the following policy recommendations are made: 
Policy recommendations 
• A simplification of border management and migration control legislation, rules and 
guidance 
• An expansion of legal routes for entry and removal of practical and financial 
impediments 
• Laws, policies and their implementation should adhere to international, domestic and 
human rights instruments to which the UK has acceded 
• Institutional bodies overseeing policy implementation should take into account human 
rights and international protection obligations in their tasks 
• Ending, or at least limiting, the use of detention and deportation 
• A review of cooperation arrangements between the Home Office and public sector 
agencies 





Appendix 1: Legislation 
 
Statutes – migration control 
Immigration Act 1971  
Immigration (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1987  
Asylum and immigration Act 1996 
Immigration and Asylum Act 1999  
The Asylum Support Regulations 2000  
The Detention Rules 2001 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002   
Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants. Etc) Act 2004  
Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006  
UK Border Act 2007  
Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 
Immigration Act 2014  
Immigration Act 2016  
Immigration Rules 2018  
 
Statutes - other 
Forgery and counterfeiting Act 1981 
Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 
Equality Act 2010 
Identity Documents Act 2010 
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 
Crime and Courts Act 2013 
Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 
 
Statutory instruments 
The Channel Tunnel (International Arrangements) Order 1993  
The Channel Tunnel (Miscellaneous Provisions) Order 1994  
The Immigration (Leave to Enter and Remain) Order 2000  
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Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (Juxtaposed Controls) Order 2003 
The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (Juxtaposed Controls) (Amendment) 
Order 2006 
The Immigration (Provision of Physical Data) Regulations 2006 SI 2006/1743  
The Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 
2006, s.7 
The Channel Tunnel (International Arrangements and Miscellaneous Provisions) 
(Amendment) Order 2007  
Immigration and Police (Passenger, Crew and Service Information) Order 2008, SI 2008/5  
 
Treaties 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 
Protocol between the Government of United Kingdom and Northern Ireland and the 
government of the French Republic Concerning Frontier Controls and Policing, 
Cooperation in Criminal justice, Public safety and Mutual assistance relating to the 
Channel fixed Link (1991)   
Protocol on the Schengen acquis Integrated into the Framework of the European Union 
2001  
Frontier Control Treaty (le Toucquet) 2003 
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Cooperation with the EU 1 
Crisis 2 
Humanitarian  9 
Illegality 20 
Numbers 6 





Threat - terrorist 5 
Threat - crime 16 
Threat – social cohesion 2 
Threat – cultural Identity 3 










2 Red Cross Former Employee Scotland 
3 Maryhill Integration 
Centre 
Member Scotland 
4 Scottish Green Party Councillor Scotland 
5 Local authority Social worker Scotland 




8 Voluntary Sector 
(RC) 
Manager Scotland 
9 Govan Community 
Centre 
 Scotland 
10  Asylum Welcome  London 
11 Voluntary Sector 
Organisation 
 London 
12 Police Scotland  Scotland 
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